In Cramaso LLP v Ogilvie-Grant, Earl of Seafield(1) the Supreme Court considered whether a party could be liable for a negligent pre-contractual misrepresentation in circumstances where the party to which the representation was originally made was not the ultimate contracting party.
The respondents were the owners of a grouse moor on the edge of the Cairngorms National Park in Scotland, which was used for commercial shooting. The respondents were seeking a new tenant to invest in the moor and increase the number of grouse. In mid-2006 the respondents entered into discussions with an interested party, Mr Erskine.
Following a visit to the moor, Erskine expressed concern that the shooting planned for the current season would leave an inadequate breeding population. In response, the respondents sent Erskine an email containing information about the grouse counts carried out on the moor earlier that year and the estimated grouse population of the moor, extrapolated from those counts (the 'key email'). In fact, these grouse counts were taken from the parts of the moor considered most heavily populated by grouse and were not representative of the whole, so the estimated total population based on extrapolation from the counts was well in excess of the actual population.
Shortly after receipt of the key email, Erskine decided to proceed with the transaction and instructed his solicitors to conclude the lease in the name of a new limited liability partnership (LLP). Erskine's solicitors informed the respondents that Erskine intended to take the tenancy in the name of a new LLP and negotiations continued uninterrupted. The appellant, Cramaso LLP, was established in November 2006 and the lease was signed shortly afterwards.
Erskine subsequently discovered that:
- the counting areas were not representative of the moor;
- the grouse population was smaller than he had believed; and
- it would take longer than anticipated to restore the grouse population to the levels that he intended.
The appellant commenced proceedings in Scotland for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation at common law (there being no statutory remedy in Scotland for negligent misrepresentation, as there is in England and Wales under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967).
The judge at first instance found that:
- the key email contained an implicit representation that the counts were representative of the rest of the moor;
- the representation had been made by the respondents honestly, but negligently; and
- the representation had induced Erskine to choose to enter into the lease.
However, the first-instance court held that the respondents could be liable to the appellant for a negligent misrepresentation only if the respondents owed the appellant a duty of care at the time when the representation was made in the key email. Because the appellant did not exist at that time, there could be no such duty, and the claim failed.
On appeal, the parties agreed that the first-instance court had been wrong to find that the appellant's non-existence at the date of the key email precluded a successful claim. However, on the basis that the respondents could not, when the key email was sent, have reasonably foreseen reliance on the representation by anyone other than Erskine, the court held that there was no proximity between the parties and so it followed, applying the test from Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman,(2) that no duty of care was owed to the appellant.
The Supreme Court noted that the lower courts had approached the case on the basis that:
- the appellant had relied on a misrepresentation made by the respondents to Erskine;
- the relevant question was whether, in that context, the respondents owed a duty of care to the appellant; and
- that question had to be answered as at the time of the key email.
The Supreme Court considered that this was not the correct approach. Instead, the starting point was to consider whether the lease was concluded on the basis of a continuing representation by the respondents to the appellant. If it was, and if the respondents assumed a responsibility towards the appellant for the accuracy of the representation such that they owed it a duty of care, the respondents could be liable to the appellant for the negligent misrepresentation.
The Supreme Court noted that, although a question of fact, a representation made as inducement to enter into contract should generally be treated as a continuing representation. A representation may not have continuing effect in some cases – for example, where it is withdrawn or lapses, or the representee discovers the true position before the contract is concluded.
The Supreme Court considered that in principle, there was no reason why a representation could not continue in circumstances where the original representee was not the contracting party. Although there was no authority on this point, in Breiss v Wooley(3) the House of Lords had considered the reverse situation. In that case, a shareholder in a company made a fraudulent misrepresentation in the course of pre-contractual negotiations. The shareholder was only subsequently authorised by the other shareholders to conduct negotiations as their agent. Nevertheless, the shareholders were held collectively liable for the fraudulent misrepresentation. The Supreme Court considered that the same principle should apply in the present case, and that a negligent misrepresentation could have continuing effect in circumstances where the original representee (as opposed to the representor) became the agent of the contracting party.
On the facts, the negotiations in the context of which the key email was sent continued in exactly the same vein after it became clear that the appellant would be the contracting party; there was no disclaimer of the representation and the representation remained operative in the mind of Erskine in his capacity as agent for the appellant. By their conduct, the respondents implicitly asserted to the appellant the accuracy of that representation and they did so in a situation where it continued to be foreseeable that the representation would induce the counterparty (whether Erskine or the appellant) to enter into a lease. They therefore assumed a responsibility to the appellant for the accuracy of the representation and owed the appellant a duty of care, which they failed to fulfil.
Although this is the first reported decision on this specific point, on the facts of the case – and in particular given that the appellant was in substance a vehicle through which Erskine took the lease – the result is unsurprising. Moreover, the Supreme Court was careful to emphasise that it was in no way extending the law of negligent misrepresentation at common law. Instead, the result followed from a proper appreciation of the continuing nature of representations and a careful analysis of the facts.
The Supreme Court's reasoning should also apply to claims under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. That sub-section imposes liability for negligent misrepresentation (provided that there would be liability at common law, had the misrepresentation been fraudulent) where "a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has been made to him by another party thereto and as a result thereof he has suffered loss" (emphasis added). In the present case, the original representation was not made to the appellant. However if, as the Supreme Court did in this case, the continuing nature of the representation is taken seriously, it can properly be said that the representation was nevertheless made to the appellant, which would have brought it within this sub-section.
For further information on this topic please contact Rupert Boswall or Daniel Hemming at RPC by telephone (+44 20 3060 6000), fax (+44 20 3060 7000) or email (email@example.com or firstname.lastname@example.org).