A federal court last week decertified a class of North Carolina homeowners who alleged breach of warranty against the manufacturer of window trim in a short, interesting decision.  See Hart v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., No. 2:08-cv-00047 (E.D.N.C., 8/30/13).

Trimboard was a product allegedly sold for use on the exterior of homes. Plaintiffs alleged it was defective in design and manufacture because it allegedly would absorb water, warp, and bulge. The court had certified a homeowner class in July, 2011.

Then in July, 2013, the North Carolina Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Christie v. Hartley Const., Inc., 745 S.E.2d 60 (N.C. App. 2013), clarifying the state's statute of repose.  Per the appeals court, the statute bars claims for damages not filed within the repose period, even in the context of an alleged an express warranty that includes a longer term than the repose peiriod.

Defendants moved for decertification, contending that the recent decision of the Court of Appeals meant that the named plaintiffs' claims were barred by the applicable statute of repose under North Carolina law. "Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings or proof show without contradiction that the statute of repose has expired." Bryant v. Don Galloway Homes, Inc., 147 N.C. App. 655, 657 (2001).

It was undisputed that this suit was filed beyond the six-year statute of repose applicable to the claims of the named plaintiffs. Since any action for damages brought outside of the statute of repose is barred, summary judgment was therefore appropriate as to the claims of the named plaintiffs.

That of course raised issues of adequacy of representation, and more importantly, predominance. The task of  determining which absent plaintiffs would be permitted to bring an action for damages would necessarily require an individualized determination of factors such as "the later of the specific last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action or substantial completion of the improvement." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5), under the statute. The necessity for such a determination did in fact destroy "typicality, ... predominance, [and] otherwise foreclose class certification." Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc., 348 F.3d 417,427-28 (4th Cir. 2003).

Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in light of the Court's broad discretion to certify or decertify a class action, Ward v. Dixie Nat. Life Inc. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 179 (4th Cir. 2010), the class certified by the court's July, 2011 order was decertified.