We don’t often get to discuss decisions from Maine. In fact, a quick spin through the blog and you’ll see Maine really only comes up in various canvases or surveys of state law. We don’t dislike the state. We love the lobster — that they take very seriously. We can’t say we love the winters there (at least this blogger doesn’t), but the coastline is beautiful in summer. And perhaps our vision of Maine is just ever so slightly skewed by Stephen King having set so many of his horror novels there. While King’s frightening tales are set in fictional towns, avid readers and explorers have suggested that you can visit several real places in Maine that seem to have inspired King’s work. For instance, if you’re looking for Derry, you want to stop in Dexter, Maine (mind the sewers). If you are more of a Cujo or Needful Things fan, Castle Rock is supposedly based on Woodstock, ME. You won’t find a giant dome in Rumford, but you’ll probably notice its otherwise close resemblance to Chester’s Mill (Under the Dome). And finally, there is King’s hometown of Bangor which is rumored to be the inspiration for the town of Haven from The Tommyknockers.

So, we were quite pleased when Dustin Rawlin and Bill Berglund of Tucker Ellis sent us their recent, far from creepy, win from the 23rd state. The case is Novak v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 2018 WL 893914 (D. Maine Feb. 14, 2018) and the primary issue is statute of limitations. Statute of limitations cases are also not something we spend too much time on here, but this one has a notable ruling specific to prescription medical products liability cases – the discovery rule does not apply.

In 2004, plaintiff underwent surgery during which defendant’s product, a vaginal sling, was implanted to treat stress urinary incontinence. Id. at *1. Around 8 months to 1 year after the surgery, plaintiff started to experience pain during intercourse and by the end of 2006 was experiencing vaginal leaking and bleeding. Id. at *2. Before the end of 2006, plaintiff informed her surgeon of her problems. He ordered tests, the first round of which were inconclusive and plaintiff failed to undergo furthering testing. Id. In 2013, plaintiff attributed her problems to defendant’s product which was partially removed in another surgery in 2014. Id. Plaintiff filed suit in 2016. Id. at *1.

Maine’s statute of limitations for all civil actions is 6 years from when the cause of action accrues. Id. at *3. Further, Maine follows the date-of-injury rule when it comes to accrual. “[M]ere ignorance of a cause of action does not prevent the statute of limitations from running.” Id. In other words, generally Maine does not apply the “discovery rule” to determine when the statute starts to run (in states that do, a claim does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the wrongdoing or misconduct). There are, however, exceptions where Maine has expressly applied the discovery rule: legal malpractice, foreign object and negligent diagnosis medical malpractice; and asbestosis. Id. General products liability claims not included.

Maine has also acknowledged the continuing tort doctrine where the alleged tort occurs over a series or chain of incidents. In such cases, the claim would not accrue until the last act in the chain – such as cases of pollution or contamination. Id. at *4. The continuing tort doctrine does not apply in cases where plaintiff’s alleged injuries, while occurring or perhaps worsening over time, are allegedly caused by a single act of negligence. Id.

Because plaintiff filed suit in 2016, her claims are time-barred if they accrued before 2010. As we noted above, her surgery was in 2004 and her complications appear to have started within the first year thereafter. So, unless the court applied the discovery rule, her claims would be barred.

Plaintiff’s first argument was that the presence of the defendant’s medical device in her body constituted a continuing tort that didn’t end until the product was removed in 2014. Id. at *5. But the continuing tort doctrine isn’t about continuing harm. What plaintiff here, or in almost any drug or device products liability case is alleging is a “finite act or set of acts (manufacture, design, inadequate warning, or misrepresentation) that led to her injuries.” Id. Once the device was implanted, the alleged wrongful act was over.

[Plaintiff] underwent only one, readily-identifiable exposure to the [device] (her surgery), and all of [defendant’s] allegedly tortious conduct took place before that point. . . . [defendant’s] wrongful conduct may have caused the [device] to deteriorate, which in turn may have caused injuries over time. However, once those injuries had manifested, the fact that their full scope remained unknown did not stop the statute of limitations from running.

Id. at *9, n.6.

Plaintiff’s second argument was that there was a genuine dispute regarding whether her earlier symptoms, pre-2006, were caused by the defendant’s medical device. Perhaps plaintiff should have thought of that argument before submitting an expert report tying those early symptoms to the medical device. Id. at *6. Nor could plaintiff rely on her surgeon not identifying a connection between the device and her symptoms when his tests were only inconclusive and plaintiff opted not to do further testing. Id. For a jury to conclude that plaintiff’s early injuries were not caused by defendant’s product would require “complete speculation.” Id. The statute started to run when plaintiff first experienced symptoms, regardless of how minor those symptoms were. Id. at *9, n.7.

While the statute of limitations did away with almost all of plaintiff’s claims, her fraud based claims remained. On those, as well as any other claim based on a failure to warn, defendant argued plaintiff failed to meet her burden to prove causation – plaintiff had no evidence that a different warning or information would have changed her surgeon’s decision to implant the device. Id. at *7. First, it is noteworthy that the court applied the learned intermediary doctrine. Id. at *8. Maine’s high court has never discussed the rule. The court relied on other federal courts interpreting Maine law on the issue.

So, applying the learned intermediary, the court’s focus correctly shifted to plaintiff’s surgeon. Plaintiff did not dispute that her doctor was aware of various risks, including those experienced by plaintiff. Id. Instead, plaintiff’s tried to meet their causation burden by arguing that the doctor “may very well have decided” not to implant the device if he had been provided different warnings. Id. But, that is either an unsupported fact or mere speculation and neither are evidence. Id. Plaintiff next showed the court some medical literature concerning the risks of the medical device and the doctor’s deposition transcript. But offered no connection between the two.

[The doctor’s] deposition transcript reflects that [plaintiff’s] counsel failed to ask him whether additional information would have altered his decision to go ahead with [plaintiff’s medical device] surgery.

Id. at *9. While not discussed directly in the opinion, requiring affirmative evidence that the doctor would have changed his use of the product for plaintiff to survive summary judgment is certainly an implicit rejection of the heeding presumption. Nor was it defendant’s obligation to ask these questions at the doctor’s deposition. Id. at *9, n.14.

So, while Maine may more quickly bring to mind images of butter poached crustaceans or mysterious floating red balloons, it’s not a bad place for prescription medical products cases either.