On November 10, 2015, the Federal Circuit issued a 2-1 panel opinion in ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. ITC, Appeal No. 2014-1527, reversing the Commission’s decision that, according to the majority “expand[ed] the scope of its jurisdiction to include electronic transmissions of digital data.” The majority opinion by Chief Judge Prost and joined by Judge O’Malley concluded that the Commission’s decision concerning the scope of Section 337 was not entitled to deference under step one of the Supreme Court’s Chevron analysis because “it is clear that ‘articles’ means ‘material things,’ whether when looking to the literal text or when read in context” of the overall statutory scheme. Because the Tariff Act does not define “articles,” the majority looked to contemporaneous and modern general dictionaries, as well as the U.S. Tariff Commission’s contemporaneous Dictionary Of Tariff Information (1924), to limit the “ordinary or natural meaning” of “article” to “material things.” The majority also found that the broader statutory context supported such a meaning, agreeing with Commissioner Johanson’s dissent in the Final Commission Opinion that an “exclusion order directed against electronic transmissions could not only have no effect within the context of Section 337—it simply would make no sense as it would not be enforce[able].” Even if Chevron step two were required, the majority found that the Commission’s decision was unreasonable because the Commission “generat[ed] its own definition, unrelated to” and broader than the definitions for “article” found in the dictionaries on which it relied and the Commission “failed to properly analyze” and misquoted the legislative history of the Tariff Act. The majority stated that the Federal Circuit’s recent ruling in Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, Appeal No. 2012-1170, “does not control here” because Suprematurned exclusively on the meaning “infringe,” whereas the instant case focused exclusively on the meaning of “articles.” In a concurring opinion, Judge O’Malley wrote that Chevron analysis was not required in this instance: “If Congress had intended for the Commission to regulate one of the most important aspects of modern-day life, Congress surely would have said so expressly.” Judge Newman dissented, writing that the text and purpose of Section 337 show that the statute was designed to reach “every type and form” of unfair competition arising from importation, including that of “digital goods.” Criticizing the majority’s reliance on dictionaries from the 1920s, the dissent stated that “the intention to omit unforeseen, later-discovered technologies cannot be imputed” to Section 337; “the Tariff Act did not lock Section 337 into the technology in existence in 1922 or 1930.” The dissent also noted that other administrative agencies and the Court of International Trade have treated electronic transmission as “goods” imported into the United States and took issue with the majority’s “reliance on possible difficulty of enforcement against electronic transmission of infringing digital data,” noting that “difficulty of enforcing a remedial statute is not grounds for judicial elimination of all remedy.” Under Federal Circuit Rules of Practice, the Commission has 45 days from entry of judgment to petition for either panel rehearing or rehearing en banc.