In Yanez v.Plummer, 221 Cal. App. 4th 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (C070726), the court held that in-house counsel’s joint representation of the company and an employee  in litigation presented triable issues of fact regarding the employee’s allegations of malpractice against counsel following the employee’s termination.  While employed by defendant, plaintiff Yanez was the sole occurrence witness of a slip and fall that injured another employee, Garcia.  On the day of the incident, at the company’s request, Yanez wrote two statements regarding the incident.  The first suggested that Yanez did not actually see the slip and fall; the second suggested that he did see the slip and fall.  Both statements included details about the poor working conditions at the time of the injury. During discovery in litigation brought by Garcia, Yanez was deposed by Garcia’s lawyer.  At the request of company’s in-house counsel, Yanez met with in-counsel before the deposition.  Counsel told Yanez that he represented both the company and Yanez, and that if Yanez told the truth, his job would not be in jeopardy.  During the deposition, in response to questioning by Garcia’s lawyer, Yanez testified that he did not actually see the slip and fall.  The company’s in-house counsel then proceeded to impeach Yanez with the second statement provided to the company by Yanez nine months earlier, obtaining admissions by Yanez under oath that resulted in his being terminated for dishonesty shortly thereafter.  Yanez sued the company for wrongful termination, and the in-house counsel for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the company, and the appellate court reversed, finding that there were triable issues of fact regarding the cause of Yanez’s termination.  At the time of the deposition, the interests of Yanez and the company were adverse; nevertheless, in-house counsel represented both employee and company without obtaining informed consent from Yanez.  Violation of the state bar rules of professional conduct prohibiting concurrent representation of conflicting interests without informed consent constitutes evidence of malpractice liability and breach of fiduciary duty.  That evidence, plus the surrounding circumstances, provided a triable issue that in-house counsel’s improper conduct was the “but for” cause of Yanez’s termination.