R. v. Albashir, 2021 SCC 48 – Constitutional law — Declaration of invalidity — Temporal nature of declaration of invalidity
On appeal from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (2020 BCCA 160) setting aside Masuhara J.’s order quashing counts and entering convictions (2018 BCSC 736).
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72,  3 S.C.R. 1101, the Court found s. 212(1)(j) of the Criminal Code, which prohibited living on the avails of sex work, to be unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalized non-exploitative actions that could enhance the safety and security of sex workers. The Court declared this offence to be inconsistent with the Charter and hence void. The declaration of invalidity did not take immediate effect but rather was suspended for one year. The Court did not explicitly state whether this declaration would apply retroactively or purely prospectively at the conclusion of the period of suspension. Two weeks before the suspension expired, the former s. 212(1)(j) was replaced with a new provision that prohibits obtaining a material benefit from sexual services but exempts legitimate, non‑exploitive conduct. Parliament did not state whether the amendments were to apply retroactively or prospectively.
About two years after the declaration took effect, the accused were charged with numerous offences arising out of an escort operation. Some of the offences occurred during the one-year period of suspension, resulting in charges under s. 212(1)(j). The trial judge found the accused to be parasitic, exploitative pimps, but he quashed the charges against both accused for living on the avails of sex work. He reasoned that once the Bedford suspension expired, the offence was unconstitutional because suspended declarations under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, have a delayed retroactive effect — meaning that once the suspension expires, the law will have always been unconstitutional —, unless it is clearly stated otherwise. The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeals and entered convictions on the counts of living on the avails of sex work. It held that the Bedford declaration never came into effect because the legislature enacted remedial legislation during the suspension, which pre‑empted the retroactive effect of the suspended declaration of invalidity.
Held (7-2): The appeals should be dismissed.
Per Wagner C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Côté, Martin and Kasirer JJ.:
In light of the purpose animating the suspension of the declaration of invalidity in Bedford, the presumption of retroactivity of a declaration of invalidity is rebutted by necessary implication. The purpose of a suspension must be considered in determining whether the declaration must logically operate retroactively or purely prospectively. In Bedford, the Court’s remedy was purely prospective, because the purpose of the suspension — avoiding deregulation that would leave sex workers vulnerable — would be frustrated by a retroactive remedy. Accordingly, the accused could be charged and convicted, after the suspension expired and the declaration took effect, for committing the offence of living on the avails of sex work under s. 212(1)(j) during the suspension period. Because they engaged in exploitative and parasitic conduct, the exact conduct that was always legitimately criminalized, a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter is not available to them.
When legislation violates a Charter right, three foundational constitutional principles guide the interpretation of constitutional remedies: constitutionalism, the rule of law, and the separation of powers. To determine an appropriate remedy, a court must consider not only the principle of constitutional supremacy in s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, but also the entitlement of the public to the benefit of legislation, as well as the different institutional roles that courts and legislatures are called to play. These foundational principles also establish strong — but rebuttable — presumptions that legislation is prospective and judicial declarations are retroactive.
There is a strong presumption against retroactive application of legislation because the rule of law requires that people be able to order their affairs in light of an established legal order. In the instant case, in the absence of retroactive legislative intent either explicitly or by necessary implication, the strong presumption that legislation is prospective is not challenged. Whereas the rule of law dictates a presumption that legislation is prospective, the inverse is true for judicial remedies. The basic role of courts to decide disputes after they have arisen requires that judicial decisions operate (at least ordinarily) with retroactive effect.
When a court makes a s. 52(1) declaration of invalidity, the same presumption of retroactivity arises. A retroactive declaration changes the law for all time, both reaching into the past and affecting the future: the law is deemed to have been invalid from the moment of its enactment. However, many fundamental principles that are essential to Canada’s constitutional system curtail the retroactive reach of judicial remedies. For example, the doctrine of res judicata and the de facto and qualified immunity doctrines balance the generally retroactive nature of judicial remedies with the need for finality and stability. When the declaration is purely prospective, the law was valid from its enactment but is invalid once the declaration takes effect.
The presumption of retroactivity can be rebutted explicitly or by necessary implication. The rare circumstances and constitutional considerations that warrant a suspension of a declaration of invalidity can justify an exception to the retroactive application of declarations where necessary to give effect to the purpose of the suspension. When retroactivity would defeat the compelling public interests that required the suspension, the presumption is rebutted and the declaration must apply purely prospectively. Courts in the future should explicitly state the temporal application of their s. 52(1) declarations to avoid any confusion.
The purpose animating the suspension in Bedford was to avoid the deregulation of sex work (thus maintaining the protection of vulnerable sex workers) while Parliament crafted replacement legislation. In light of that purpose, the declaration of invalidity was purely prospective, effective at the end of the period of suspension. A retroactive declaration would have rendered the regulatory system of criminal offences that was maintained by the suspension entirely unenforceable once the suspension expired, undermining the protection of the vulnerable victims that was at the root of the finding of unconstitutionality. Conversely, prospective application is far more consonant with the purpose of the Bedford suspension and more protective of sex workers’ rights.
When a s. 52(1) declaration is prospective, a person whose Charter rights are breached by the law declared to be unconstitutional is not left without a remedy. A prospective declaration does not deprive people of individual remedies and would not contravene the principle that nobody may be convicted of an offence under an unconstitutional law. Where the compelling public interests that required suspending the declaration would not be undermined and when additional relief is necessary to provide an effective remedy in a specific case, s. 24(1) is a flexible vehicle that can be combined with s. 52(1). The findings of unconstitutionality by the court can operate retroactively in individual cases, giving remedial effect to both ss. 24(1) and 52(1). Following the findings of Bedford, if an accused is charged with conduct that bears no relation to the purpose of the living on the avails offence — for example because they were a legitimate driver or bodyguard — an application judge may find a breach of that accused’s s. 7 rights and grant a s. 24(1) remedy.
Per Brown and Rowe JJ. (dissenting):
The declaration of invalidity in Bedford had retroactive effect as of the date the suspension expired, rendering s. 212(1)(j) of the Criminal Code void ab initio. Remedial legislation did nothing to cure the constitutional defect in s. 212(1)(j) as it existed in the past, and could do nothing to alter the Court’s declaration that s. 212(1)(j) is unconstitutional. As such, s. 212(1)(j) was unconstitutional at the time the accused were found guilty, and the s. 212(1)(j) counts must accordingly be quashed.
Ordinarily, constitutional declarations of invalidity are retroactive, and have immediate effect. This is the logical implication of s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The retroactive nature of constitutional declarations of invalidity also flows from the nature of judicial remedies generally. An immediate retroactive declaration of invalidity renders the law invalid from the date of the declaration, back to the date the law was enacted.
Although the Court recognized the predominance of the retroactive approach, it also recognized two important exceptions: prospective declarations and suspended declarations. Prospective declarations of invalidity apply only forward in time from the moment of the declaration, but do not render a law invalid back in time from the moment of its enactment, as though the law never existed. Suspended declarations of invalidity delay the moment when the effects of a declaration of invalidity, whether retroactive or prospective, become operative. When a retroactive declaration of invalidity is suspended, the law is treated as valid for the period of the suspension, but when the suspension period expires, it is as though the law had always been invalid. An immediate prospective declaration of invalidity renders a law invalid from the date of the declaration forward into the future, but not back into the past. The law was and remains valid from the date it was enacted until the date of the prospective declaration. A prospective declaration of invalidity with a suspension, often called a transition period, works in a similar way to an immediate prospective declaration, except that the declaration becomes effective only when the transition period ends.
Prospective declarations raise concerns, because they fail to address any past unconstitutional effects of a law. Similarly, suspended declarations of invalidity are deeply controversial, because they allow an unconstitutional state of affairs to persist, thereby posing a threat to the very idea of constitutional supremacy.
When a court issues a declaration of constitutional invalidity and intends that declaration to deviate from the traditional norm of retroactivity and immediacy, it must say so deliberately and explicitly, in order to avoid confusion. Only a clear statement that a declaration is prospective, suspended, or prospective with a transition period, will suffice, because of the strong presumption that constitutional declarations are retroactive and immediate. While prospective and suspended remedies are available, it must be borne in mind that they are not explicitly authorized by the text of s. 52(1). They are deviations from the traditional and widespread understanding of the role of the judiciary in which courts grant retroactive relief applying existing law or rediscovered rules which are deemed to have always existed.
Similarly, when a legislature enacts new legislation in order to correct the unconstitutional effects of a law during a period of suspension of invalidity, the temporal effect of the new law should be stated explicitly so as to avoid confusion. There is a strong presumption that laws are of prospective, and not of retroactive, effect. However, the presumption that legislation applies prospectively can be rebutted by either express words or necessary implication. Therefore, where a legislature wishes legislation to be retroactive, so as to avoid a legal gap that would arise when the period of suspension of invalidity of a retroactive declaration of invalidity expires, it should make this explicit in the legislation.
Suspending a retroactive declaration of invalidity can be an uneasy fit in the criminal law context, because criminal prosecutions take time. When an offence is declared void ab initio by a court, no one can thereafter be convicted of that offence, even for conduct that occurred prior to the declaration. This is because the offence will be deemed to have never existed and no one can be found guilty of an unconstitutional (and non‑existing) law. Accused persons can only be convicted of the offence during the brief window of the suspension. The suspension therefore accomplishes little, precisely because criminal prosecutions take time to move through the system.
The Court could have issued a prospective declaration in Bedford, but did not. Bedford did not say that the declaration was prospective, and retroactivity is the default position. The absence of any explicit justification for a prospective ruling weighs against interpreting a declaration as having a prospective effect only, especially in the criminal context, because of the general rule that no one should be convicted of an offence under an unconstitutional law. The potential for continued, active enforcement of an unconstitutional criminal law gives rise to rule of law concerns and weighs against imposing a declaration that is prospective only. It also weighs against interpreting an ambiguous declaration as prospective, after the fact. Accordingly, the declaration from Bedford had retroactive effect, as of the date the suspension expired.Reasons for judgment: Karakatsanis J. (Wagner C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Côté, Martin and Kasirer JJ. concurring)Dissenting Reasons: Rowe J. (Brown J. concurring)Neutral Citation: 2021 SCC 48Docket Number: 39277, 39278https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/19083/index.do