For a number of reasons, the cost of litigation is a hot topic at the moment.  

Lord Justice Mummery in giving the lead judgment of the Court of Appeal in Neumans LLP v Andrew Andronikou & Ors [2013] EWCA Civ 916, suggested a way that he and his brethren could assist in ensuring that legal costs are kept to a minimum by judges keeping their judgments as short as possible.  

He held that this would (at paragraph 40 of the judgment) “stem the soaring costs of litigants when their advisers have to spend too long working out what the law is. They may be faced with a multiplicity of separate, complex, discursive and (increasingly, imitating the style of subordinate legislation) cross-referential judicial pronouncements at different levels of decision, or at the same level of decision, but sometimes leading to the same overall result.”

In this case which concerned a solicitor’s costs generated by the liquidation of Portsmouth Football Club, the Court of Appeal upheld the judgement below of Mr Justice Morgan.  

Lord Justice Mummery asked (at paragraph 36): “What sensible purpose could be served by this court repeating in its judgments detailed discussions of every point raised in the grounds of appeal and the skeleton arguments when they have already been dealt with correctly and in detail in the judgment under appeal? No purpose at all, in my view.”

He advocated (at paragraph 37) that courts should follow the “excellent lead” of Lord Wilberforce in Brumby v Milner (1975) 51 TC 583. In this case, Lord Wilberforce (with whom the rest of the court agreed) gave a single page opinion In a one-page tax opinion, stating that he would go no further in stating the law than the Court of Appeal had done below (who themselves affirmed the judgment of Walton J at first instance).    

Lord Justice Mummery continued (at paragraphs 38-39):  

“… The proper administration of justice does not require this court to create work for itself, for other judges, for practitioners and for the public by producing yet another long and complicated judgment only to repeat what has already been fully explained in a sound judgment under appeal. If the judgment in the court below is correct, this court can legitimately adopt and affirm it without any obligation to say the same things over again in different words. The losing party will be told exactly why the appeal was dismissed: there was nothing wrong with the decision appealed or the reasons for it.”   

“… It can do so, as in an old style judgment, by setting out short legal propositions relevant to this case and the conclusions reached by applying them in this case. It does not begin to attempt to cover all the law on administration and liquidation expenses. That would not be a proper exercise in a judgment.”