On August 25, BuckleySandler secured a substantial victory in a putative class action in the Northern District of Illinois. McGann v. PNC, No. 11-c-6894 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2015). The suit alleged that a major mortgage servicer failed to convert Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) Trial Period Plans (TPPs) into permanent modifications. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, with jurisdiction over the Northern District of Illinois, has allowed similar claims to survive dismissal. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012). And the Ninth Circuit has allowed such claims to go forward on a classwide basis. See Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Nos. 11-16234, 11-16242, 2013 WL 4017279 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2013).

Despite this potentially adverse precedent relevant to the pleadings stage, BuckleySandler secured summary judgment in its client’s favor following extensive discovery by extracting key admissions from Plaintiff. These admissions established that the servicer “repeatedly told her either that her application was being reviewed or that it had been rejected but would be reinstated. A promise to review or even to reinstate an application is not a promise that the application will result in a permanent loan modification . . . she still had to meet HAMP’s requirements. That was clear from the TPP agreement itself.” Opinion at 9. The Court further held that even if these statements led Plaintiff to a subjective belief that the loan would be modified, Plaintiff could not show any actions she took in reliance, nor that any reliance would be reasonable. Opinion at 11.

Finally, the Court also held that the servicer did not engage in any unfair conduct under Illinois’ UDAAP statute, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The plaintiff in the matter was not a borrower on the note, but rather a non-borrower mortgagor, for whom HAMP was not available during the time in question. The Court agreed the servicer complied with HAMP guidelines in denying the permanent modification. Opinion at 16-17. And the Court went on to hold that the servicer was entitled to summary judgment for the additional reason that the evidence in discovery established that the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries was her non-qualification for HAMP, her inability to pay the mortgage, and the resulting foreclosure of the home, none of which was proximately caused by any wrongful conduct of the servicer. Opinion at 15-16.