On September 1, 2016, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit largely affirmed dismissal of a relator’s amended complaint pursuant to the particularity requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). In US ex rel. Presser v. Acacia Mental Health Clinic, LLC, the relator, a nurse, alleged that a number of practices at a clinic where she worked were not medically necessary. These were: requiring patients to see multiple practitioners before receiving medication; requiring patients to undergo mandatory drug screenings at each visit; and requiring patients to come to the clinic in-person in order to receive a prescription or speak to a doctor. (The relator also alleged that clinic misused a billing code. This was the only claim the Seventh Circuit permitted to go forward.) In dismissing the majority of the relator’s complaint, the Seventh Circuit began with a robust discussion of the importance of Rule 9(b) in screening out baseless False Claims Act (FCA) claims:

Rule 9 requires heightened pleading standards because of the stigmatic injury that potentially results from allegations of fraud. We have observed, moreover, that fraud is frequently charged irresponsibly by people who have suffered a loss and want to find someone to blame for it. The requirement that fraud be pleaded with particularity compels the plaintiff to provide enough detail to enable the defendant to riposte swiftly and effectively if the claim is groundless. It also forces the plaintiff to conduct a careful pretrial investigation and thus operates as a screen against spurious fraud claims. (Citations and quotations omitted).

The Seventh Circuit held that the relator fell far short of Rule 9(b), because she provided “no medical, technical, or scientific context which would enable a reader of the complaint to understand why Acacia’s alleged actions amount to unnecessary care.” The court further observed that the relator did not offer any reasons why the practices were unnecessary other than her “personal view” — the complaint was devoid of any context, such as a comparison of relator’s clinic’s practices to others in the industry. And while the relator attempted to rely on her 20 years of “experience and training,” this was simply not enough. The court concluded by holding that a relator’s subjective evaluation, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis for a fraud claim.

The lesson of this case is clear: where an FCA complaint alleges that care was medically unnecessary (as many FCA complaints do), the relator must provide sufficient reasons, other than relying on his or her personal opinion, experience and training, as to why. A relator cannot simply assert that care was unnecessary and hope to fill in the blanks with discovery.