On August 10, 2015, in an en banc Opinion written by Circuit Judge Reyna, the Federal Circuit upheld the Commission’s position in Suprema, Inc. v. ITC,AppealNo. 2012-1170, that trade relief is available under 19 U.S.C. §1337(a)(1)(B)(i) for induced infringement based on the importation of goods that, after importation, are used by the importer to directly infringe at the inducement of the goods’ seller. A majority panel of the Court had disagreed, reasoning that there are no “articles that infringe” at the time of importation when direct infringement does not occur until after importation. Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 742 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Judge Reyna noted that “[i]n so doing, the panel effectively eliminated trade relief under Section 337 for induced infringement and potentially for all types of infringement of method claims.” Judge Reyna began the en banc Opinion by emphasizing that Congress has been vigilant both to encourage and protect U.S. domestic interests in connection with unfair commercial activity involving foreign imports and “established a distinct legal regime in Section 337 aimed at curbing unfair trade practices that involve the entry of goods into the U.S. market via importation.” The issue for the en banc Court to decide was whether the importation of goods that are used, after importation, to directly infringe by the importer at the inducement of the goods’ seller qualify as an unfair trade act under Section 337. Because the en banc majority found that Congress has not directly answered whether such goods qualify under the language “articles that infringe” of Section 337, the en banc majority appliedChevron deference to the nearly 35 years of Commission precedent interpreting Section 337 to embrace induced infringement. It found the Commission’s interpretation to be “reasonable” and “consistent with the statutory text, policy, and legislative history of Section 337.” It also found that the Court “has consistently deferred to the Commission, recognizing the Commission’s technical expertise in deciding issues arising under Section 337, a statute Congress has entrusted the agency to administer.” A Dissenting Opinion by Circuit Judge O’Malley, joined by Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Lourie and Dyk stated that “the majority strains to find an ambiguity in the statute where there is none, just so that it may resort to the protective umbrella of Chevron.” Judge Dyk also wrote a separate dissenting opinion objecting to the Commission's issuance of exclusion orders directed to all of the subject articles, even those that ultimately may never be used to infringe, and stating that allowing “the importer to certify that certain of the staple articles will not ultimately be used to infringe reads the statute backwards.” The case was remanded to the original panel for further proceedings consistent with the en banc Opinion.