The Tenth Circuit has in the past refused to give preclusive effect in bankruptcy non-dischargeability actions brought under § 523(a)(2) to pre-petition default judgments arising from claims of actual fraud. In re Jordana, 216 F.3d 1087 (10thCir. 2000). However, the Tenth Circuit recently held that this refusal does not extend to pre-petition default judgments based on violations of securities laws where the claim for non-dischargeability is brought under § 523(a)(19), and that such judgments must be given preclusive effect for purposes of denying the dischargeability of the debt. Tripoldi v. Welch et al, 810 F.3d 761 (10th Cir. 2016).
Robert Tripoldi brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah against Nathan Welch and others alleging violations of state and federal securities laws. Welch answered the complaint, but during the course of the litigation, his attorneys withdrew and Welch never retained new counsel. Eventually, the trial court issued a default judgment against Welch. Welch subsequently filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and then filed motions with the district court to set aside the default judgment and grant judgment on the pleadings in Welch’s favor. Tripoldi filed a motion with the district court to declare the pre-petition default judgment non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(19). The district court denied Welch’s motions and granted Tripoldi’s.
On appeal, after determining the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering the default judgment or in denying the motion to vacate it, the Tenth Circuit then turned to the issue of whether the default judgment could be the basis for a denial of discharge under § 523(a)(19). Welch argued that a default judgment should not be the basis for the denial of a discharge, relying on the Tenth Circuit’s prior opinion inJordana. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, and noted what it considered to be significant differences between § 523(a)(2) and § 523(a)(19). The court stated that it declined to extend its reasoning in Jordana to default judgments based on violations of securities laws because § 523(a)(2) and § 523(a)(19) “have different requirements and different purposes.” The court placed great importance on the fact that § 523(a)(19) contains the specific requirement that the debt be memorialized in a “judgment, order, decree or settlement agreement” stemming from a violation of securities laws, whereas § 523(a)(2) contains no such requirement. The court also that Congress, in enacting § 523(a)(19) to include the requirement of a judgment, intended to close what it perceived to be a “loophole in the law.” The noted its decision was consistent with those of two other courts to rule on the issue: In re Pujdak, 462 B.R. 560 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2011) andMeyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375 (7th Cir. 1994) (interpreting § 523(a)(11) which contained a similar requirement).