Internet service providers and online service providers of websites, auction sites, television broadcasts, radio broadcasts and other online media (“service providers”) have long thought they had broad immunity from copyright infringement claims under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). As the recent Viacom decision in the Second Circuit instructs, service providers should recognize that such broad immunity may not exist and think carefully about failing to remove or disable access to user-posted content that disqualifies them from the “safe harbor” provisions of the DMCA.

In Viacom, a case of first impression, the court held that the “willful blindness” doctrine applied to demonstrate the knowledge or awareness of a service provider of specific instances of infringement under the DMCA. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 10-3270, 10-3342, Slip Op. at 22 (2nd Cir. 2012), 102 USPQ 2d 1283, 1291 (2d Cir. 2012). Moreover, the court held that service providers must stand trial if there is evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that defendants had actual knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement under the DMCA. The court noted that while the DMCA does not require affirmative monitoring, online providers and service providers shall not make a “deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge.”

District Court Proceedings

The Viacom case involved two related class actions that include as the plaintiffs the following: Viacom International, Inc., The Football Association Premier League Ltd., and various film studios, television networks, music publishers and sports leagues for themselves and on behalf of others similarly situated. The plaintiffs alleged that defendants YouTube, Inc., YouTube, LLC, and Google Inc. (collectively, “YouTube”) engaged in direct and secondary copyright infringement based on the public performance, display and reproduction of approximately 79,000 audiovisual clips that appeared on the YouTube website between 2005 and 2008. Plaintiffs demanded statutory damages in an amount up to $150,000 per work infringed. The plaintiffs in both actions appealed from the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, wherein the District Court held that defendants are entitled to safe-harbor protection from infringement liability provided by DMCA in 17 U.S.C. §512(c).

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “District Court”) had previously granted YouTube’s motion for summary judgment, holding that YouTube was entitled to safe harbor protection primarily under 17 U.S.C. §512(c) because it had insufficient notice of the particular infringements set forth in the suit.

Second Circuit Opinion

On appeal, the Second Circuit interpreted § 512(c), confirmed the District Court correctly concluded that the § 512(c) safe harbor requires knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity, but held that summary judgment in favor of YouTube was premature because a reasonable juror could find that YouTube had actual knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity on its website.

The court concluded that the statutory phrases “actual knowledge that the material is infringing” and “facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent” both refer to “knowledge or awareness of specific and identifiable infringements.” The court explained that under § 512(c)(1)(A), knowledge or awareness alone does not disqualify the service provider for the safe harbor; rather, the service provider that gains knowledge or awareness of infringing activity retains safe-harbor protection only if it “acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).

The court thus held that “actual knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances that indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement will disqualify a service provider from the safe harbor.” Slip Op at 19.

Applying this test to the facts of this case, the court reviewed the record and found:

  • An email by the director of video partnerships for Google and YouTube, requesting that his colleagues take down any “clearly infringing, official broadcast footage” from a list of certain premier league clubs in advance of a meeting with the heads of several major sports teams and leagues;
  • A 2006 report by one of YouTube’s co-founders stating that episodes and clips of certain well-known shows could still be found on YouTube’s website and that YouTube would benefit from preemptively removing content that was “blatantly illegal;” and
  • Emails by another co-founder that suggested that a CNN video clip of the space shuttle should be left on the website until CNN’s legal department requests that it be taken down.

In light of these facts in the record, the court held that the plaintiffs had raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding YouTube’s knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement. The court therefore remanded the case for a determination of whether any specific infringements of which YouTube had knowledge or awareness correspond to the clips–in-suit. Slip Op. at 22. Further, the court remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of whether the plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that YouTube had the right and ability to control the infringing activity and received a financial benefit directly attributable to that activity. Slip Op. at 28-29.

Conclusion

In light of Viacom, service providers of online services that accept user-posted content such as artwork, text, video clips, music clips, television broadcasts and radio broadcasts should, in the absence of counsel’s contrary advice, immediately remove or disable access to infringing content when a take-down notice or other information raises any reasonable inference of actual knowledge of specific infringing activity. If there is any serious doubt about whether the service provider is on notice of facts that raise such a reasonable inference of infringement, it is advisable to remove the content immediately, rather than incur the risk of copyright infringement with a potential risk of liability for up to $150,000 in statutory damages per work and payment of the copyright owner’s reasonable attorneys’ fees.