Trends in Regulatory Enforcement in UK Financial Markets 2015/16 Mid-Year Report By Robert Patton and Marcin Pruski While record-setting fines imposed on banks for interbank and foreign exchange rate manipulation have dominated the headlines, other fines levied on firms have also risen substantially. Fines against individuals remain low, but policy changes may be laying the groundwork for stepped up enforcement of market abuse and increased fines on senior managers. www.nera.com 1 Trends in Regulatory Enforcement in UK Financial Markets 2015/16 Mid-Year Report Robert Patton and Marcin Pruski1 15 October 2015 NERA Economic Consulting maintains a proprietary database of fines and other enforcement activity by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and, previously, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), including data on fines back to 1 April 2002.2 We undertake a detailed analysis of recent enforcement activity and how it conforms to stated priorities, revealing underlying trends not necessarily visible from a review of individual cases. Introduction Following the release in June 2015 of the final report by the Fair and Effective Markets Review (FEMR), the then-chief executive of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), Martin Wheatley, declared that enforcement had reached an “inflection point”, suggesting that if new regulatory measures are successful in bringing about a change in culture, this will result in an end to the era of “big-stick fines”.3 Recently, however, the FCA has wielded the big stick with gusto, at least against firms, having imposed an unprecedented £1.4 billion in fines and penalties in the 2014/15 financial year, which it is on pace to exceed in 2015/16. The 2014/15 fines alone exceed cumulative fines levied by the FCA and its predecessor, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), in all previous years combined (aggregate fines are reported in Table 1 and Figure 1). This level of fines and penalties is also more than three times the level of aggregate fines in each of the preceding two financial years, 2012/13 and 2013/14, each of which in turn was unprecedented in comparison with earlier years. In the first six months of the current financial year, FCA has already imposed £794 million in fines and penalties. If this pace were to continue over the second half of the year, then 2015/16 would be yet another record-beating year. 2 www.nera.com Table 1. Annual FCA Fines 2011/12—2015/16 (First Half) Number of Fines1 Aggregate Fines (£m)1 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/162 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/162 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Individuals 40 19 22 24 5 £ 19.9 £ 5.0 £ 3.9 £ 7.1 £ 0.8 Firms 23 26 27 27 9 58.9 422.2 416.9 1,403.1 793.5 Totals 63 45 49 51 14 78.8 427.2 420.8 1,410.3 794.3 Notes and Sources: 1 The annual number and aggregate amount of fines shown here differ from statistics reported by the FCA in its Annual Reports (for example, the FCA’s reported 2014/15 totals were 43 and £1,409.8 million, respectively) because, beginning with its 2009/10 Annual Report, the FCA assigns each fine to a financial year based on the publication date of the press release announcing the fine, whereas NERA uses the date of the final notice. Moreover, the FCA does not take into account fines that were reduced to zero owing to financial hardship. 2 Figures for the 2015/16 financial year cover the first half of the financial year, to 30 September 2015. Figure 1. Aggregate Annual FCA Fine Amounts against Both Firms and Individuals 98.7 78.8 120.2 301.8 189.4 283.1 307.0 119.0 105.9 226.8 1,114.9 284.4 794.3 13.4 27.6 33.5 98.7 78.8 427.2 420.8 1,410.3 1,588.6 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000 2002/03 - 2007/081 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/162 Aggregate Amount (£ millions) Financial Year Fines excluding Interbank Rate and FX Interbank Rate Fines FX Fines Projected Notes and Sources: 1 Annual average. 2 Figures for the 2015/16 financial year cover the first half of the financial year, to 30 September 2015. The projected amount represents the annual total that will have been obtained if aggregate fines in the second half of the 2015/16 financial year equal fines in the first half. www.nera.com 3 Fines against firms in recent years have been dominated by large sanctions against banks and other financial institutions for foreign exchange market (FX) manipulation and for manipulation of LIBOR4 and other interbank interest rates.5 Fines for FX manipulation amounted to £1.11 billion in 2014/15, nearly 80% of the total, and fines for FX and interbank rate manipulation combined have accounted for £2.16 billion, more than two thirds of the £3.05 billion in fines imposed over the past three and a half financial years. Even absent any potential shift in enforcement approach as signalled by Mr Wheatley, aggregate fine levels may fall as the FCA moves beyond fines for FX and interbank rate manipulation. These fines arguably represent an unusual combination of particularly serious alleged conduct, substantial documentary evidence (for example in the form of instant-messenger transcripts), and international cooperation that has allowed the FCA and regulators in other countries to pool resources.6 This combination may not necessarily be repeated in the context of subsequent enforcement. Even excluding fines for interbank rate manipulation and FX, the aggregate amount of fines against firms has still risen, albeit to less stratospheric levels. In 2014/15, fines not related to FX or interbank rates manipulation totalled £189.4 million, which, although substantially lower than the £301.8 million for such fines in 2013/14, is almost double the amount imposed in any given year prior to 2012/13. Moreover, the £283.1 million in non-FX, non-interbank rate fines imposed so far in 2015/16 is on pace to exceed any previous year. The average fine against firms, excluding those for FX and interbank rate manipulation, has risen from £5.0 million in 2012/13 to £40.3 million in 2015/16 to date. The median fine against firms in the first half of 2015/16 has reached £20.7 million, approximately 50% more than the median in 2014/2015 and about three and a half times the median in 2012/13. It is possible, however, that more benchmark fines could follow, consistent with a FEMR recommendation, as at 1 April 2015, seven additional UK-based financial benchmarks have been brought within the scope of FCA regulation. These include the WM/Reuters London 4pm Closing Spot Rate, ISDAFIX, London Gold Fixing and the LBMA Silver Price, and the ICE Brent Index. In July 2015, the FCA published the results of a thematic review into the oversight and control of financial benchmark activities. Although the FCA acknowledged that firms had improved their governance and controls around benchmark activities, none of the 12 banks and brokerage firms involved in the review “had fully implemented changes across all benchmark activities”.7 It is possible that, if the firms do not tighten their supervision over benchmark activities, more fines will follow. In fact, in late September, Switzerland’s competition commission, WEKO, launched an investigation into possible collusion in the precious-metals markets by UBS, Julius Baer, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Barclays, Morgan Stanley, and Mitsui.8,9 It is unclear whether this development portends additional FCA enforcement in this area. In contrast to the record-setting fine amounts imposed on firms, the FCA’s final notices reflect a lower level of enforcement against individuals than might be expected given its stated focus on holding senior management to account and tackling market abuse. The number and aggregate amount of fines against individuals increased in the 2014/2015 financial year compared with the prior year, but in the aggregate still amounted to only half of the peak level reached in 2011/2012. Moreover, fines confirmed in the first half of 2015/16 have slowed compared with 2014/15. In addition, the low number and aggregate amount of fines imposed on individuals has not been offset by an increase in other types of enforcement activity, such as prohibitions or public censures.10 4 www.nera.com Going forward, however, this picture may change dramatically. First, several fines have been announced by the FCA but are still subject to appeal and thus not yet captured in our numbers. In August, the FCA won a High Court decision granting penalties totalling £1.1 million against three individuals for market manipulation. Most significantly, between November 2014 and May 2015, the FCA issued decision notices worth just under £80 million against three former senior managers at Keydata, including one for £75 million against a single individual, Stewart Ford, Keydata’s former CEO.11 The fines are currently being contested in the Upper Tribunal. If upheld, the £75 million fine against Mr Ford would be the largest ever by a large margin—over 12 times the largest fine to date. Looking further into the future, FEMR’s recommendations include extending the scope of the existing regulatory framework such that, in addition to senior bankers and insurers, it would cover hedge funds and other asset managers. If so, approximately 57,000 additional individuals would be subject to FCA supervision, in addition to approximately 74,000 at present. These recommendations are one of several regulatory initiatives aimed at increasing the accountability of senior management. In March 2016, the Senior Managers Regime is scheduled to take effect. It supplements the FCA’s Approved Person Regime by increasing the supervision of financial institutions’ senior management and aims to raise standards for individual conduct. These changes may lay the groundwork for greater enforcement against individuals once enacted.12 Another factor that may lead to more fines on individuals is new European legislation, the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). From 3 July 2016, this will become effective in the UK and across the European Union (EU). The primary goal of MAR is to enhance market integrity and investor protection while providing uniform rules in a single rulebook across the EU.13 MAR will replace the existing Market Abuse Directive (MAD), extending its coverage to “new markets, new platforms and new behaviours”.14 As discussed below, the extension of the scope of market abuse enforcement may also result in more fines against individuals, who traditionally constitute the bulk of activity in fines for market abuse. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. First we discuss trends both in fines and in other sanctions against firms, then enforcement against individuals, in both cases including recent trends and the outlook for future activity. We then turn to the FCA’s use of its criminal powers and to trends in appeals to the Upper Tribunal. www.nera.com 5 Enforcement against Firms As discussed in the introduction above and reflected below in Figure 2, fines against firms reached an all-time high in 2014/15, and are on pace to exceed that through the first half of 2015/16. Below, we first discuss fines for the alleged manipulation of interbank rate and FX benchmarks, putting FCA fines in the context of global enforcement and the fines assessed by other regulators. We then look at the largest-ever fines imposed by the FCA, including examining the largest fines other than the interbank rate and FX ones. We consider the role of the revised penalty framework in fines against firms. Finally, we review financial penalties against firms in the context of other sanctions in the FCA’s toolkit, considering trends in the imposition of non-monetary sanctions. Figure 2. Aggregate Annual FCA Fine Amounts, Annual Median, and Average Fine Amounts against Firms Fines excluding Interbank Rate and FX Interbank Rate Fines FX Fines Projected Notes and Sources: 1 Annual average. 2 Figures for the 2015/16 financial year cover the first half of the financial year, to 30 September 2015. The projected amount represents the annual total that will have been obtained if aggregate fines in the second half of the 2015/16 financial year equal fines in the first half. 90.0 58.9 115.2 297.9 182.6 282.2 307.0 119.0 105.6 226.8 1,114.9 284.4 793.5 13.0 26.3 30.9 90.0 58.9 422.2 416.9 1,403.1 1,586.9 2.9 6.0 14.5 20.7 16.2 16.7 61.0 88.2 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2002/03 - 2007/081 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/162 Median and Average Fine (£ millions) Aggregate Amount (£ millions) Financial Year Median Fine Average Fine 6 www.nera.com Global Enforcement Activity Relating to Alleged Manipulation of Interbank Rate and FX Benchmarks As part of the investigation by multiple regulators into alleged rigging of LIBOR and other interbank rates, nine banks and two brokerage firms have been fined to date by at least one regulator worldwide, with only three of these banks avoiding a fine from the FCA.15 The non-UK regulators that have participated include the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), US Department of Justice (DOJ), the New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS), the Swiss Financial Markets Authority (FINMA), the Public Prosecution Service of the Netherlands, the European Commission, and the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bafin). Although the fines for interbank lending rate manipulation are among the largest imposed by the FCA, from many banks, including UK banks, the FCA has collected less than have many other regulators. For instance, as Figure 3 shows, the largest fine for interbank lending rate manipulation imposed by the FCA—for £227 million, levied on Deutsche Bank AG (Deutsche Bank) in April 2015—was the smallest of the fines imposed on Deutsche Bank by various regulators for this conduct and amounted to approximately 10% of the £2.27 billion imposed by all regulators. Similarly, the £88 million fine imposed by the FCA on the Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS) accounts for just about 12% of the £716 million imposed by all regulators. The size of LIBOR fines has been exceeded by the fine amounts imposed in connection with alleged FX manipulation. In 2014/15 alone, the FCA handed down £1.1 billion in FX fines, which was more than 2.5 times the aggregate amount of interbank rate-related fines imposed over the last three financial years (see Figure 1). Figure 3. Fines Imposed in Connection with the Alleged Manipulation of Interbank Rates (By Agency) Notes and Sources: Original fine amounts by agencies outside the UK were converted to GBP using exchange rates obtained from Bloomberg L.P. as of the dates of fines. CFTC: US Commodity Futures Trading Commission; DOJ: US Department of Justice; NYDFS: New York State Department of Financial Services; FINMA: Swiss Financial Markets Authority; PPS: Public Prosecution Service of the Netherlands; EC: European Commission; FCA: Financial Conduct Authority. 1 The aggregate fine imposed by the FCA includes a £70 million penalty for misconduct related to alleged manipulation of the repo rate benchmark. 51 141 203 96 438 515 40 62 128 296 208 431 531 398 58 66 370 324 602 105 60 105 88 160 227 60 2 54 58 66 217 330 370 663 716 1,069 2,273 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 RP Martin ICAP Citigroup J.P. Morgan Lloyds1 Barclays Societe Generale Rabobank RBS UBS Deutsche Bank Fines (£ millions) DOJ CFTC NYDFS EC FCA PPS FINMA www.nera.com 7 Aggregate global fines imposed to date in relation to alleged FX manipulation are £5.8 billion, with multiple investigations pending. In contrast to the case of interbank rate fines, FX-related fines imposed by the FCA have been broadly comparable to financial penalties imposed by other agencies, including the DOJ, the CFTC, the NYDFS, the FINMA, and the Federal Reserve System (Fed) (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). Figure 4. Fines Imposed in Connection with the Alleged Manipulation of FX Rates (By Regulator) Notes and Sources: Original fine amounts by regulators outside the UK were converted to GBP using exchange rates obtained from Bloomberg L.P. as of the dates of fines. CFTC: US Commodity Futures Trading Commission; DOJ: US Department of Justice; NYDFS: New York State Department of Financial Services; FINMA: Swiss Financial Markets Authority; FCA: Financial Conduct Authority; Federal Reserve System (Fed). DOJ CFTC Fed NYDFS FCA FINMA 254 354 595 418 174 184 184 196 196 254 132 220 176 220 220 220 312 216 234 217 222 226 284 88 132 391 726 831 993 1,238 1,489 0 300 600 900 1,200 1,500 1,800 Bank of America HSBC UBS RBS J.P. Morgan Citigroup Barclays Fines (£ millions) The Top 10 Fines against Firms Unsurprisingly, interbank rate and FX fines dominate the 10 largest fines against firms: six of the top 10 were issued in connection with the foreign exchange manipulation scandal, and two are related to interbank benchmark manipulation (see Table 2). The exceptions in the top 10 fines are the £137.6 million “London Whale” fine against J.P. Morgan for poor risk management practices, mismarking, systems and controls violations, and other alleged misconduct relating to trading losses sustained by the bank’s Chief Investment Office and the £126 million fine against Bank of New York Mellon for failure to comply with the FCA’s client money rules. To get a better sense of the most important enforcement outcomes against firms aside from interbank rate and FX fines, we have also constructed a list of the top 10 fines excluding these categories. Notably, all but one of the fines on this alternative top 10 list have been imposed in the past three financial years, underscoring that fines on firms have been rising even excluding those relating to interbank rate and FX manipulation (see Table 3). This is the case despite the potential diversion of FCA resources into interbank rate and FX investigations from other enforcement activities. 8 www.nera.com Table 2. Top 10 FCA Fines against Firms 2002/03—2015/16 (First Half) Fine Rank Firm Financial Year Total Fine Category of Misconduct (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 1 Barclays 2015/16 £ 284,432 Failure to Prevent Misconduct (FX) 2 UBS 2014/15 233,814 Failure to Prevent Misconduct (FX) 3 Deutsche Bank AG 2015/16 226,800 Market Manipulation (Interbank Rate) 4 Citigroup 2014/15 225,575 Failure to Prevent Misconduct (FX) 5 J.P. Morgan 2014/15 222,166 Failure to Prevent Misconduct (FX) 6 RBS 2014/15 217,000 Failure to Prevent Misconduct (FX) 7 HSBC 2014/15 216,363 Failure to Prevent Misconduct (FX) 8 UBS 2012/13 160,000 Market Manipulation (Interbank Rate) 9 J.P. Morgan 2013/14 137,610 Transaction Reporting, Record-Keeping, & Pricing Failures 10 The Bank of New York 2015/16 126,000 Mishandling Client Assets Mellon (London Branch) Notes and Sources: Fine amounts are in thousands of GBP. Table 3. Top 10 FCA Fines against Firms, Excluding Interbank Rate and FX Fines 2002/03—2015/16 (First Half) Fine Rank Firm Financial Year Total Fine Category of Misconduct (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 1 J.P. Morgan 2013/14 £ 137,610 Transaction Reporting, Record-Keeping, & Pricing Failures 2 The Bank of New York 2015/16 126,000 Mishandling Client Assets Mellon (London Branch) 3 Lloyds 2015/16 117,431 Mistreatment of Customers & Mishandling of Complaints 4 RBS 2014/15 42,000 Transaction Reporting, Record-Keeping, & Pricing Failures 5 Barclays 2014/15 37,745 Mishandling Client Assets 6 J.P. Morgan 2010/11 33,320 Mishandling Client Assets 7 HomeServe 2013/14 30,647 Unsuitable Investments & Mis-Selling 8 Prudential 2012/13 30,000 Other Compliance Failings by Firms 9 UBS 2012/13 29,700 Failure to Prevent Misconduct 10 Lloyds 2013/14 28,039 Unsuitable Investments & Mis-Selling Notes and Sources: Fine amounts are in thousands of GBP. www.nera.com 9 The Role of the Revised Penalty Framework in Fines against Firms One factor that may contribute to the observed increase in fine amounts is the FCA’s Revised Penalty Framework,16 which applies to fines sanctioning conduct that occurred wholly or mostly subsequent to 6 March 2010. The revised framework, which aims to make the determination of fine amounts more transparent and systematic, has been used to determine fine amounts in a growing proportion of cases. In 2011/12, less than 10% of fines were determined at least in part under the revised framework. However, the revised framework was used to compute at least part of the fine amount for 31 of 49 fines in 2013/14, 37 of 51 in 2014/15, and 12 of 14 in 2015/16. The details differ for firms and individuals (and depending on whether market abuse is alleged), but expressed generically, the steps of the revised framework are as follows: • Step 1: the removal of any financial benefit derived directly from the breach (disgorgement). • Step 2: the determination of a figure that reflects the seriousness of the breach. • Step 3: an adjustment made to the Step 2 figure to take account of any aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances. • Step 4: an upward adjustment that may be made to the amount arrived at after Steps 2 and 3, where appropriate, to ensure that the penalty has an appropriate deterrent effect. • Step 5: a settlement discount to be applied if relevant. This discount does not apply to disgorgement. As detailed below, some recent fines have included a component computed under the Revised Penalty Framework and a component under the previous framework. This has been true of all fines imposed in connection with FX manipulation. This hybrid approach is used when some of the misconduct occurred before and some after 6 March 2010. For example, the £233.8 million fine against UBS for FX manipulation included £188.3 million for misconduct after 6 March 2010 assessed under the new framework and £45.5 million, corresponding to breaches of principles prior to 6 March 2010, computed based on the old framework. Between 2011/12 (the first financial year in which fines were assessed under the new framework) and 2015/16, 34 fines were issued relating to conduct that straddled the 6 March 2010 date: 63 fines imposed solely under the Revised Penalty Framework and 125 fines falling into the old penalty framework (91 of which were issued in the period 2011/12–2012/13). As Figure 5 shows, the aggregate fine amount assessed under the Revised Penalty Framework has grown relative to that assessed under the old penalty framework. 10 www.nera.com In 2013/14, fine amounts issued under the Revised Penalty Framework exceeded those under the old framework for the first time, by approximately £100 million. Since then, the excess of fine amounts computed under the Revised Penalty Framework over those computed under the old framework has increased in each financial year. Under the Revised Penalty Framework, the FCA takes into account previous fines or other enforcement actions against the same individual or firm in Step 3, even if those fines were for conduct unrelated to the fine at issue. In assessing the November 2014 fine against UBS, for example, the FCA cited a 2012 fine against UBS for alleged LIBOR manipulation, but also several previous fines against UBS in respect of different misconduct. After also taking into account other aggravating factors, the November 2014 fine was increased by an unprecedented (for firms) 55% in Step 3.17 When the fine amount is already high before applying the uplift, such a percentage will of course translate into a large increase in amount paid. Figure 6 shows that at Step 3 increases are more common than reductions, both for firms and for individuals. Figure 5. Fines Issued under the Previous and Revised Penalty Frameworks 2011/12 – 2015/16 (First Half) 60.7 223.4 130.3 162.5 41.2 73.6 78.4 143.1 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/161 0 300 600 900 1,200 Fines (£ millions) Old Penalty Framework (Excluding Top 10) Old Penalty Framework (Top 10) Revised Penalty Framework (Excluding Top 10) Revised Penalty Framework (Top 10) 69.2 9.6 385.9 41.3 161.6 259.1 364.1 1046.1 211.6 582.3 Notes and Sources: Cross-hatched parts of the bars correspond to fines computed under both the old and new frameworks (for which the FCA provides a breakdown between the old and new penalty frameworks). 1 Figures for the 2015/16 financial year cover the first half of the financial year, to 30 September 2015. 123.6 898.8 431.6 216.1 61.9 68.9 205.6 36.4 Financial Year www.nera.com 11 Consideration of past fines as an aggravating factor is likely to continue to put upward pressure on fine amounts, particularly for large, diversified financial institutions, which have often faced at least one prior enforcement action by the FCA. Figure 6. FCA Fines under the Revised Penalty Framework, Breakdown of Fines by “Step 3” Adjustment 2011/12 – 2015/16 (First Half) 1 2 5 19 14 8 6 3 2 1 1 2 22 5 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 7 41 19 10 8 3 3 2 0 9 18 27 36 45 -40% A No Adjustment 0% < A < -30% -30% A < -20% -20% A < -10% -10% 10% 10% < A 20% 20% < A 30% 30% < A 40% 40% < A 50% < A 50% A < -0% Number of Fines Fines against Firms Fines against Individuals “Step 3” Adjustment (A) 12 www.nera.com Non-Monetary Enforcement Measures against Firms Fines are not the only sanction in FCA’s arsenal. Figure 7, based on data from the FCA’s annual reports and brought up to the middle of the 2015/16 financial year based on a review of final notices, shows the annual number of fines, but also other types of non-monetary enforcement measures (see the Appendix for the description of the various types of enforcement measures). Figure 7. FCA Enforcement Activity against Firms by Type of Action 2007/08 – 2015/16 (First Half) Variation/Cancellation/Refusal of Authorisation /Approval/Permissions Financial Penalty Prohibition Public Censure Suspension Projection Notes and Sources: Data are from "Enforcement Activity" appendices to FCA annual reports for financial years 2007/08—2013/14 and the final notices issued throughout the 2014/15 and 2015/16 financial years. Prior to 2014/15, the annual number of fines shown here differ from statistics reported by NERA in Table 1 because, beginning with its 2009/10 Annual Report, the FCA assigns each fine to a financial year based on the publication date of the press release announcing the fine, whereas NERA uses the date of the final notice. Moreover, the FCA does not take into account the fines that were reduced to zero due to financial hardship. 1 Does not include Threshold Condition outcomes where FCA has only cancelled a firm’s Part 4A permission or its registration. 2 Figures for the 2015/16 financial year cover the first half of the financial year, to 30 September 2015. The projected amount represents the annual total that will have been obtained if aggregate fines in the second half of the 2015/16 financial year equal fines in the first half. 39 42 80 39 30 6 3 38 21 16 33 19 35 20 28 27 23 8 6 4 4 8 6 3 4 57 81 104 79 58 40 33 68 30 60 0 24 48 72 96 120 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/141 2014/15 2015/162 Number of Outcomes Financial Year www.nera.com 13 The FCA’s enforcement activity against firms increased throughout the 2014/15 financial year. Although the number of financial penalties remained in line with previous years, the Authority has increased its use of alternative measures, such as cancellations of permission to operate within the UK financial industry. Moreover, the 2014/15 financial year was the first in which the FCA used its power to impose suspensions that temporarily restrict firms from conducting any business or recruiting new staff. Suspensions can be seen as an attractive alternative to financial penalties, particularly when companies are facing financial hardship. In short, with respect to enforcement against firms, the FCA appears to be making substantial use not only of financial penalties but also of other measures at its disposal. 14 www.nera.com Enforcement against Individuals Despite the rhetorical emphasis placed by the FCA on enforcement against individuals,18 the number and aggregate amount of fines against individuals have remained low for several years. As Figure 8 shows, in 2014/15, aggregate fine amounts rose to £7.1 million: higher than in the prior two years, but still below the peak of nearly £20 million in 2011/12. Over the first six months of 2015/16, the FCA imposed just five fines on individuals totalling less than £850,000, a pace of £1.7 million per annum. The last time the FCA imposed less than £2 million in fines, or fewer than 15 fines in total, was in 2008/09 and, before that, during the “light touch” era. However, Figure 8 excludes several fines being challenged in the Upper Tribunal or that are under appeal, including one fine that could be several times any previous fine in its magnitude. First, approximately £1.1 million in fines was assessed on three individual traders, following a High Court decision in August 2015 in favour of the FCA (the decision also imposed fines on two involved firms: approximately £1.5 million on Da Vinci Invest Limited and £5 million on Mineworld Limited). The individuals were found to have engaged in “spoofing” and “layering” (that is, submitting quotations to give an artificial impression of market conditions).19 The decision, according to which two firms were also ordered to pay a total of nearly £6.5 million in fines, is still under appeal. If the fines imposed on the three individuals were included in the total for the first half of 2015, it would still come to less than £2 million, or less than £4 million on an annualised basis, comparable to 2013/14 but otherwise lower than in any year since 2009/10. More significantly, three former senior managers at Keydata are currently contesting penalties and disgorgement worth a total of just under £80 million for allegedly failing to act with integrity and misleading the FCA. This includes a fine of £75 million sought against Keydata’s former CEO, Stewart Ford. If upheld, the fine on Stewart would dwarf the current largest-ever fine high of £6.1 million on Rameshkumar Goenka in 2011 for market abuse and would change the individual fines picture dramatically. The exceptional size of the fine sought by the FCA is largely a consequence of a high level of proposed disgorgement: £72.4 million. So it may not indicate a sharp upward trend in individual fine sizes, unless there are more fines in future with a very large disgorgement component. However, even the implied penalty component of £2.6 million (i.e., the balance of the £75 million after subtracting the disgorgement) would be high enough for inclusion on the list of all-time top 10 fines against individuals. The Keydata matter has already produced the largest confirmed fine imposed in 2015/16, against Craig McNeil, Keydata’s former finance director. McNeil allegedly did not seek to establish why midway through 2008 bonds issued by a special purpose vehicle incorporated in Luxembourg and purchased on behalf of Keydata clients stopped paying quarterly fees and interest payments. As a consequence, the FCA fined McNeil £350,000 and issued an order prohibiting him from performing any significant influence function in relation to any regulated activity carried on by any authorised person. www.nera.com 15 Several large fines were imposed in 2014/15, one of sufficient size to be included in the all-time top 10. This was against Alberto Micalizzi, who was fined for fraud related to the sale of “sham” convertible bonds. Micalizzi had contested a fine by referring the case to the Upper Tribunal, but the Tribunal directed the FCA to impose a £2.7 million fine. The fine against Micalizzi is the fifth largest imposed on an individual and the third largest considering only the penalty (that is, excluding the disgorgement component shown in column 5 of Table 4). See Table 4 for the current list of 10 highest fines imposed against individuals. Figure 8. Aggregate Annual FCA Fine Amounts, Annual Median, and Average Fine Amounts against Individuals Notes and Sources: 1 Annual average. 2 Figures for the 2015/16 financial year cover the first half of the financial year, to 30 September 2015. The projected amount represents the annual total that will have been obtained if aggregate fines in the second half of the 2015/16 financial year equal fines in the first half. 1.3 1.6 5.9 4.2 2.5 3.9 1.0 4.4 2.8 15.7 2.5 2.7 0.4 1.3 2.6 8.7 19.9 5.0 3.9 7.1 1.7 32.6 52.5 43.9 86.5 100.0 75.0 63.0 209.3 228.1 73.8 56.9 87.1 181.2 498.3 265.2 203.0 324.8 212.1 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 2002/03 - 2007/081 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/162 Median and Average Fine (£ thousands) Aggregate Amount (£ millions) Financial Year Fines Excluding Top 10 Fines Top 10 Fines Projected Median Fine Average Fine 16 www.nera.com Other high-profile fines include the penalty imposed on Ian Hannam, who was fined £450,000 for disclosing non-public information about a potential third-party bid for Heritage Oil, Hannam’s client at the time, to the Minister for Oil in the Kurdish Regional Government. Like Micalizzi, Hannam appealed to the Upper Tribunal, arguing that he was merely acting in the interests of his client and that the information was not material, but the Tribunal directed the FCA to impose the full £450,000 fine that it originally sought. Finally, some individual enforcement activity has related to alleged manipulation of interbank benchmarks. Recently, the FCA prohibited Paul Robson from carrying out any function in relation to any regulated activity carried out by any authorised person, exempt person, or exempt professional firm, following Robson’s guilty plea to count 1 of the indictment (conspiracy).20 Previously, enforcement actions were taken against former senior executives of Martin Brokers, David Caplin and Jeremy Kraft. In 2013/14, Caplin and Kraft were fined £210,000 and £105,000, respectively, for compliance and cultural failings that resulted in interbank rate manipulation. Although no individuals have been fined in relation to direct interbank rate manipulation, the FCA is currently investigating Christian Bittar, a former Deutsche Bank trader, who may face a fine of up to £10 million if found guilty of alleged attempts to manipulate interbank benchmarks.21 In parallel, the Serious Fraud Office is conducting a criminal investigation into Bittar’s actions; however, no charges have been filed as yet.22 Table 4. Top 10 FCA Fines against Individuals 2002/03—2015/16 (First Half) Fine Financial Total Rank Individual Year Penalty Disgorgement Fine Category of Misconduct (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 1 Rameshkumar Goenka 2011/12 £ 4,138 £ 1,971 £6,109 Market Manipulation 2 David Einhorn 2011/12 3,000 638 3,638 Insider Dealing 3 Ravi Sinha 2011/12 1,500 1,367 2,867 Fraud or Other Deliberate Misconduct 4 Simon Eagle 2010/11 1,500 1,300 2,800 Market Manipulation 5 Alberto Micalizzi 2014/15 2,700 0 2,700 Fraud or Other Deliberate Misconduct 6 Michiel Wieger Visser 2011/12 2,000 0 2,000 Market Manipulation 7 Stefan Chaligne 2012/13 900 363 1,263 Market Manipulation 8 Sachin Karpe 2012/13 1,250 0 1,250 Mishandling Client Assets 9 Samuel Nathan Kahn 2011/12 884 211 1,095 Market Manipulation 10 Mehmet Sepil 2009/10 700 267 967 Insider Dealing Notes and Sources: Fine amounts are in thousands of GBP. www.nera.com 17 In line with the decrease of aggregate fine amounts imposed against individuals over the last few years, as shown in Figure 9, the FCA’s overall enforcement activity against individuals recorded a significant decline. Figure 9 shows not only number of fines but also variations, cancellations, or refusal of authorisation/approval/permission to perform controlled functions, prohibitions from performing controlled functions, public censures, and suspensions. It indicates that the low levels of financial penalties imposed on individuals have not been offset by greater incidence of other types of enforcement. For example, 10 prohibitions have been issued in 2015/16 to date, on track to be the lowest for any year up to the “light touch” era. Although the count of public censures is in line with the historical trend, the number of financial penalties is still significantly below the levels observed throughout the 2009/10–2011/12 financial years. Figure 9. FCA Enforcement Activity against Individuals by Type of Action 2007/08 – 2015/16 (First Half) Notes and Sources: Data are from “Enforcement Activity” appendices to FCA annual reports for financial years 2007/08–2013/14 and the final notices issued throughout the 2014/15 and 2015/16 financial issued throughout the 2014/15 and 2015/16 financial years. Prior to 2014/15, the annual number of fines shown here differ from statistics reported by NERA in Table 1 because, beginning with its 2009/10 Annual Report, the FCA assigns each fine to a financial year based on the publication date of the press release announcing the fine, whereas NERA uses the date of the final notice. Moreover, the FCA does not take into account the fines that were reduced to zero owing to financial hardship. 1 Does not include Threshold Condition outcomes where FCA has only cancelled a firm’s Part 4A permission or its registration. 2 Figures for the 2015/16 financial year cover the first half of the financial year, to 30 September 2015. The projected amount represents the annual total that will have been obtained if aggregate fines in the second half of the 2015/16 financial year equal fines in the first half. 38 59 36 55 42 13 11 25 11 23 27 48 39 22 19 22 4 25 51 53 69 47 35 26 24 10 5 6 4 5 67 5 4 138 122 176 133 75 58 75 25 0 40 80 120 160 200 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/141 2014/15 2015/162 Number of Outcomes 50 Variation/Cancellation/Refusal of Authorisation /Approval/Permissions Financial Penalty Prohibition Public Censure Suspension Projection 18 www.nera.com The Outlook for Fines against Individuals Looking ahead, several factors could increase the level of fines against individuals. One is that the FCA has stepped up its use of “attestations” as a formal supervisory tool that involves a senior executive at a regulated firm giving a personal guarantee that a certain action has been or will be taken. The FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority say they are employing attestations to ensure clear accountability in particular on behalf of executives and board members. As stated by Clive Adamson, then FCA director of supervision, “[i]f we find a particular problem has not been addressed, the attestation would make it easier to take enforcement action. That is part of the point.”23 Although the FCA has been making more extensive use of the attestation tool, the practice was initiated by the FSA following unsuccessful outcomes in enforcement actions aimed at sanctioning senior managers for misconduct within their firms. According to the FCA, attestations are used mainly in the following scenarios:24 • Notification: a guarantee to notify the regulator in case an emerging risk changes in nature, magnitude, or extent. • Undertaking: a guarantee that a specific action will be taken within a particular time frame. • Self-certification: confirmation that risks related to more significant issues have been mitigated or resolved. • Verification: confirmation that certain issues have been resolved and that they have been verified (for example, by an internal auditor). Another factor that may lead to increased fines on individuals is that, from 3 July 2016, new European legislation, the Market Abuse25 Regulation (MAR), will become effective in the UK and across the EU. The primary goal of MAR is to enhance market integrity and investor protection while also providing uniform rules in a single rulebook across the EU.26 MAR will replace the existing MAD, extending its coverage to “new markets, new platforms and new behaviours”.27 In particular, MAR will cover a wider set of financial instruments and benchmarks (including commodities benchmarks), expands the behaviours that constitute insider dealing and market manipulation, and imposes additional disclosures on issuers and others to facilitate insider dealing enforcement.28 Even within the limits of the existing regulatory framework, the FCA has recently carried out multiple high-profile investigations against individuals (and firms) involved in market abuse. For example, the authority appears to have prioritised enforcement against market abuse, such as layering or spoofing. In March 2014, the FCA imposed a fine of £662,700 on Mark Stevenson, who engaged in a series of transactions that were alleged to have artificially increased the price of a bond he was attempting to sell. In July 2013, Michael Coscia, who was fined £597,993 for alleged manipulation of commodities futures on the UK’s ICE Futures Europe Exchange using an algorithmic program he had allegedly designed to engage in layering. www.nera.com 19 Trends in Criminal Cases NERA also tracks criminal indictments and convictions by the FCA, based upon FCA press releases and other public sources. As Table 5 shows, 28 individuals were indicted by the FCA in the three years up to 31 March 2015,29 with another three indicted so far this year. Sixteen of these 31 indictments involved allegations of insider dealing, 10 of which related to a single investigation, “Operation Tabernula”, which is according to the FCA its largest and most complex insider-dealing investigation to date.30 The first arrests in connection with Operation Tabernula took place in 2010. The three remaining insider-dealing-related indictments involved Damian Clarke, Paul Coyle, and Ryan Willmot. Clarke, a former equity trader at Schroders plc, following his arrest in January 2013 was charged with nine counts of insider dealing related to trading shares and spread bets. Coyle was accused of taking advantage of his former role as the Treasurer and Head of Tax at Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc and trading in advance of a proposed joint venture with Ocado Group plc. Finally, Willmot, a former manager at a technology company Logica, used price-sensitive information obtained in the course of his employment to trade in Logica shares during its £1.7 billion takeover by CGI Group of Canada in 2012. In the last six months the FCA pressed insider-dealing-related charges against another three individuals: Manjeet Singh Mohal, Reshim Birk, and Surinder Pal Singh Sappal have been accused of trading on insider information received from family friend Ryan Willmott. FCA criminal enforcement has also focused on Approved Person Regulation Failures and Land Banking. As part of “Operation Cotton”, an investigation by the FCA into land banking firms, eight individuals have been accused of defrauding investors of over £5 million between 2008 and 2011 through sales of essentially worthless plots of land. The remaining seven indictments are related to acts of fraud or conducting unauthorised business activity despite having been issued a prohibition order; in Table 5 these are included in the “Other Indictments” category. Table 5. FCA Criminal Indictments 2002/03—2015/16 (First Half) Indictment Year1 Prior to 2010/11 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/162 Total (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Indictment of Individuals SUM (1)-(7) Insider Dealing 12 14 4 8 1 4 3 46 Land Banking 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 8 Other Indictments3 17 1 0 3 3 1 0 25 Total 29 15 4 11 12 5 3 79 Notes and Sources: Data are from the FCA press releases, supplemented by a review of news articles. The table includes only named defendants. 1 If the indictment date is not reported in the FCA’s press release, the arrest date is used. 2 Figures for the 2015/16 financial year cover the first half of the financial year, to 30 September 2015. 3 Includes cases of mis-selling, theft, fraud, illegal deposit-taking, and failure to cooperate with the FCA. 20 www.nera.com The FCA also secured jail sentences in several cases that originated in prior years, most of which related to insider-dealing convictions (see Table 6). For example, in 2012/13 the FCA secured sentences for seven out of eight individuals investigated as part of another large insider dealing investigation, “Operation Saturn”. The Operation Saturn defendants were convicted of using pricesensitive information to place spread bets in advance of proposed or planned takeover bids. One individual, Mitesh Shah, was cleared of any wrongdoing. The FCA investigation lasted over four years and included extensive use of forensic technology. Three additional sentences were secured as part of Operation Tabernula, and six other defendants are still on trial. Both Paul Milsom and Graeme Shelley acted on confidential information provided by Julian Rifat; all three pleaded guilty and were sentenced in 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively. At present, Clive Roberts is the only Operation Tabernula defendant against whom the charges were dropped prior to a potential trial. The existing status of each individual charged as part of operations Saturn and Tabernula is summarized in Table 7. Table 6. FCA Criminal Verdicts 2002/03—2015/16 (First Half) Verdict Year1 Prior to 2010/11 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/162 Total (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Outcomes SUM (1)-(7) Insider Dealing Convictions 5 5 1 12 1 3 0 27 Land Banking Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 Other Convictions3 9 0 4 1 2 3 8 27 Acquittals 1 3 0 5 4 0 0 13 Total 15 8 5 18 7 6 16 75 Notes and Sources: Data are from the FCA press releases, supplemented by a review of news articles. The table includes only named defendants. 1 If the verdict date is not reported in the FCA’s press release, the sentencing date is used. 2 Figures for the 2015/16 financial year cover the first half of the financial year, to 30 September 2015. 3 Includes cases of mis-selling, theft, fraud, illegal deposit-taking, and failure to cooperate with the FCA. www.nera.com 21 Among other convictions, the FCA secured a jail sentence in 2012/13 for one individual involved in boiler room fraud and two individuals who were charged in 2014/15 for conducting unauthorised business and unauthorised investment schemes. Overall, the FCA investigations have now led to 54 convictions, 27 of which relate to insider-dealing cases. Related to FCA criminal enforcement, though not directly involving the FCA, in early August 2015, the Serious Fraud Office secured a jail sentence for Tom Hayes, the first individual to be found guilty of committing fraud in relation to the LIBOR-rigging scandal. Hayes, a former trader at Citigroup and UBS, was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment31 for his involvement in manipulating the LIBOR benchmark. Six other traders are scheduled to stand trial on LIBOR-related charges.32 Table 7. FCA Criminal Investigations Key Insider Dealing Operations Name Current Status Indictment Year Verdict Year (1) (2) (3) (4) Operation Saturn Ali Mustafa Jail Sentence 2010 2012 Pardip Saini Jail Sentence 2010 2012 Mitesh Shah Acquitted 2010 2012 Paresh Shah Jail Sentence 2010 2012 Neten Shah Jail Sentence 2010 2012 Bijal Shah Jail Sentence 2010 2012 Truptesh Patel Jail Sentence 2010 2012 Richard Joseph Jail Sentence 2011 2012 Operation Tabernula Julian Rifat Jail Sentence 2013 2014 Martyn Dodgson Charged 2012 n.a. Graeme Shelley Jail Sentence 2012 2013 Paul Milsom Jail Sentence 2012 2012 Clive Roberts Acquitted 2014 n.a. Benjamin Anderson Charged 2012 n.a. Andrew Hind Charged 2012 n.a. Iraj Parvizi Charged 2012 n.a. Richard Baldwin Charged 2012 n.a. Grant Harrison Charged 2012 n.a. Notes and Sources: Data are from the FCA press releases, supplemented by a review of news articles. 22 www.nera.com Trends in Contested Fines The Upper Tribunal handed down five decisions relating to contested fines during 2014/15. In each case, the regulator prevailed. Three of these cases involved single individuals, one focused on two Directors at Catalyst Investment Group Limited (Catalyst), and the final decision involved allegations against Arch Financial Products and its two most senior employees: Robin Farrell and Robert Addison, the company’s CEO and COO, respectively. Farrell and Addison were accused of not having implemented systems and controls adequate to manage conflicts of interest and not acting with integrity when such conflicts arose. Ultimately, both were prohibited from performing any function in relation to any regulated activity and fined an aggregate amount of £850,000. The FCA stated that, had it not been for serious financial hardship, it would have imposed a financial penalty of £9 million on the firm as well. The two former directors at Catalyst are Timothy Roberts and Andrew Wilkins, who were sanctioned by the FCA for providing misleading information to investors relating to the licence position of ARM Asset Backed Securities SA (ARM), an issuer of collateralised bonds. Despite the fact that ARM was prohibited from issuing bonds without a licence from the Luxembourg regulator, Catalyst continued to distribute ARM’s products to its investors. The Upper Tribunal prohibited Roberts from performing any function in relation to a regulated activity and fined Roberts and Wilkins £450,000 and £50,000, respectively. The other three decisions involved allegations brought against Tariq Carrimjee, Angela Burns, and Clive Rosier, all of whom are awaiting a final notice from the FCA. Although all of these fines are to be less than £100,000, the largest penalty, £89,004, was imposed on Carrimjee, who is alleged to have assisted one of his clients, Rameshkumar Goenka,33 in executing trades that led to market abuse. Burns and Rosier were fined £20,000 and £10,000, respectively. The five hearings on contested fines in 2014/15, although in line with the number of fines contested in 2013/14, represent a decline in the number of fines contested compared with the period 2010/11– 2012/13 (see Figure 10, which shows the names of the parties whose appeals succeeded in avoiding a fine). Tribunal hearings have typically followed the FCA’s decision notices by one or two years, so the increase in contested cases observed in 2010/11 may be seen as aligning with the timing of the FCA’s stated shift in enforcement philosophy, and the decline in the past two years may stem from the decline in enforcement against individuals as discussed above. Although no decisions relating to fines have been handed down to date in 2015/16, pending Upper Tribunal hearings involve three former senior managers at Keydata (as previously mentioned, a distributor of structured investment products to retail customers). As discussed above, the FCA is currently seeking to fine Stewart Ford (ex-CEO), Mark Owen (ex-Sales Director), and Peter Johnson (ex-Compliance Officer) for failing to act with integrity by offering retail investors Lifemark-backed products that the FCA says violated Individual Savings Account regulations and by knowingly misleading the Authority on the performance of those securities.34 The FCA is seeking to impose fines of £75 million, £200,000, and £4 million, respectively. The fine sought against Ford would be the highest ever imposed against an individual by a wide margin.35 www.nera.com 23 Figure 10. Decisions on Fines by the Upper Tribunal, by Year of Hearing 0 3 6 9 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 14/15 15/161 Number of Upper Tribunal Cases Financial Year of Tribunal Hearing Fined Not Fined Notes and Sources: Data are from the Upper Tribunal website. 1 Figures for the 2015/16 financial year covers the first half of the financial year, to 30 September 2015. Baldwin & Wrt Investments Ltd John Pottage Paul Davidson & Ashley Tatham Jason Geddis Raymond Wagner David Hobbs Another series of high-profile, though not fine-related, matters referred to the Upper Tribunal involve individuals who claim that the FCA improperly identified them in final notices against firms. The FCA is required to protect the identity of individuals in final notices involving firms, to avoid any prejudice to cases against the individuals. If the Authority decides to reveal the identity of an individual involved, it is required to provide the individual with the right to make representations before findings are made public. At least eight traders allege that they were improperly identified in the FCA’s published final notices when fining banks for wrongdoing. One is Christian Bittar, the former Deutsche Bank trader who faces a fine of up to £10 million in connection with alleged interbank benchmark rate manipulation. Previously, Achilles Macris successfully challenged the FCA for having implicitly identified him in the “London Whale” final notice. 24 www.nera.com Conclusion With more than £1.4 billion in fines imposed by the FCA in 2014/15, and £793 million imposed in the first half of 2015/16, the amount collected from firms in fines over the past year and a half exceeds that collected in all past years. A number of large fines, particularly related to interbank and FX benchmark rate manipulation, have dominated headlines and account for a substantial proportion of these totals, but fine amounts have increased for other types of fines as well. The increased use of the Revised Penalty Framework and, in particular, the uplift applied in Step 3, is one factor driving fine sizes up for firms. Although fines against individuals have declined in recent years, several regulatory policy developments may reverse this trend. The Senior Managers Regime, the upcoming introduction of MAR, and certain FEMR recommendations serve to expand the scope of FCA regulation and/or provide the FCA with additional tools that may be used in enforcement action against individuals. Moreover, when the criminal enforcement against individuals involved in interbank rate or FX manipulations is concluded, financial penalties may follow. More broadly, how lenient or strict enforcement will be going forward may also depend substantially on how public, political, and industry sentiment evolve with respect to the correct balance between vigorously policing markets and pursuing wrongdoing on the one hand, and encouraging innovation and a thriving financial sector on the other. This factor is difficult to quantify and predict, but undeniably relevant. www.nera.com 25 Appendix: Non-fine Enforcement Measures • Cancellation of Permission. “Under section 55H(3) of the Act (Variation by FCA at request of authorised person), if an FCA-authorised person applies to the FCA, the FCA may cancel its Part 4A permission. Cancellation applies to a firm’s entire Part 4A permission that is to every activity and every specified investment and not to the individual elements such as specified investments. Changes to the individual elements of permission would require a variation.”36 • Variation of Permission. “Under section 55H of the Act, an FCA-authorised person may apply to the FCA to vary its Part 4A permission to: o allow it to carry on further regulated activities, other than a Prudential Regulation Authorityregulated activity; o reduce the number of regulated activities it is permitted to carry on; or o vary the description of its regulated activities (including by the removal or variation of any limitations).”37 • Refusal/Approval of Authorisation. “Firms and individuals can only conduct regulated financial service activities in the UK if they are authorised by the [FCA] to do so.”38 “If [the] application is successful [the FCA writes to the firm/individual] confirming [their] authorisation and enclosing [their] Scope of Permission Notice. This is [their] formal Part IV permission and will set out when the permission starts, which regulated activities [they] have permission to carry on, and any requirements or limitations requested.”39 • Prohibition Order. “An order made under section 56 of the Act (Prohibition orders) which prohibits an individual from performing a specified function, any function falling within a specified description, or any function.”40 • Public Censure. Either: o “a statement published under section 205 (Public censure) of the Act; o a statement of misconduct published under section 66 (Disciplinary powers) of the Act; o a statement published under section 123 (Power to impose penalties in cases of market abuse) of the Act; or o a statement published under section 87M (Public censure of issuer) of the Act, under section 88A (Disciplinary powers: contravention of s88(3)(c) or (e)) of the Act or under section 91 (Penalties for breach of Part 6 rules) of the Act.”41 • Suspension. The right to: o “suspend a firm for up to 12 months from undertaking specific regulated activities; or o suspend an individual for up to two years from undertaking specific controlled functions.”42 26 www.nera.com Notes 1 Mr Patton is an Associate Director and Mr Pruski is an Economic Analyst at NERA Economic Consulting. The authors would like to thank Bradley Heys for valuable feedback on earlier drafts, and Sophia Khuntsaria, George Moschopoulos, Davide Oneglia, and Kaitlin Simpson for research assistance. 2 On 1 April 2013, the Financial Services Act 2012 came into force, and the FCA superseded the FSA as financial enforcement regulator. In this paper, unless indicated otherwise, we write “FCA” or “the Authority” to refer to the FSA and the FCA collectively. Throughout this paper, unless otherwise indicated, information relating to fines is taken from NERA’s database of final notices obtained from the FCA website. 3 “Bank enforcers look for cultural shift after fines fail to curb cycle of scandal”, Financial Times, 12 June 2008. See also the “Fair and Effective Markets Review”, June 2015. 4 LIBOR stands for the London Interbank Offered Rate and is a series of benchmark rates that banks charge one another for short-term unsecured loans of various maturities. It serves as a reference rate for many financial products and contracts. It is set on a daily basis based on estimated borrowing rates submitted by major banks. 5 For example, Euribor is the Euro Interbank Offered Rate. It is a series of benchmark rates at which large European banks make short-term unsecured loans in euros to one another. It is set on a daily basis based on estimated borrowing rates submitted by major European banks. 6 “FX Fixing Scandal: US Authorities Tipped to Piggy Back on London Watchdog Settlement”, International Business Times, 7 November 2014. 7 Financial Conduct Authority, “Financial Benchmarks: Thematic review of oversight and controls”, p. 5, July 2015. 8 “Swiss Investigate Seven Firms Over Precious Metals Market Trading”, The Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2015. 9 “Broken Benchmarks”, Bloomberg, available at: http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/broken-benchmarks. 10 As discussed below, the only type of enforcement that seemed to have registered increased activity involved cancellation of permissions to act as approved person to perform controlled functions. 11 FCA decision notice, available at:https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/decision-notices/stewart-owen-ford. 12 The Senior Managers Regime is part of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013. 13 FCA, “One minute guide – Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)”, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/firm-guides/mar. 14 FCA, “One minute guide – Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)”, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/firm-guides/mar. 15 Société Générale S.A. (Société Générale), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (J.P. Morgan), and Citigroup Inc. (Citigroup) have each been fined only by the European Commission. 16 This is the revised approach to determining fine amounts that was implemented in 2010. 17 The highest adjustment in the history of the Revised Penalty Framework was applied in the case of Samuel Kahn, whose fine was increased by 100% as part of Step 3. This was the first fine ever imposed under the Revised Penalty Framework. 18 See for example, the FCA’s Business Plan 2015/16, pp. 54 - 55, available at: http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/corporate/business-plan-2015-16. 19 See “FCA secures High Court Judgment awarding injunction and over £7 million in penalties against five defendants for market abuse”, press release 12 August 2015 (http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-secures-high-court-judgmentawarding-injunction-and-over-7-million-in-penalties). 20 In early 2014 Robson was charged by the DOJ with one count of conspiracy and 13 counts of wire fraud relating to his attempts to manipulate the Japanese yen LIBOR. www.nera.com 27 21 The case was referred to the Upper Tribunal on 12 May 2015. 22 “Ex-Deutsche Bank trader files case against FCA”, The Financial Times, 19 May 2015. 23 “Top executives targeted on compliance”, The Financial Times, 27 May 2013. 24 See Clive Adamson’s letter to Graham Beale clarifying the FCA’s use of attestations, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/attestations-clive-adamson.pdf. 25 Broadly, market abuse includes insider dealing, market manipulation, and misleading statements relating to investments. 26 FCA, “One minute guide – Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)”, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/firm-guides/mar. 27 FCA, “One minute guide – Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)”, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/firm-guides/mar. 28 FCA, “One minute guide – Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)”, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/firm-guides/mar. 29 Eleven in 2012/13 plus 12 in 2013/14 plus 5 in 2014/15 = 28. 30 FCA press release, “Former Moore Capital trader pleads guilty to insider dealing”, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/news/former-moore-capital-trader-pleads-guilty-to-insider-dealing. 31 Currently, Hayes is working on an appeal against his sentence and an attempt to overturn his conviction. 32 “Next wave of UK Libor charges seen targeting Euribor traders”, The Business Times, 21 September 2015. 33 In 2011/12 the FCA imposed an all-time-high fine of £6.1 million on Goenka, a Dubai-based private investor, who used layering to manipulate the prices of global depository receipts linked to baskets of Russian companies and Indian securities. 34 “FCA bans and fines Keydata finance director £350k”, Professional Adviser, 22 September 2015. 35 “The Morning Risk Report: U.K. Regulator Steps Up Enforcement Against Individuals”, Dow Jones Institutional News, 29 May 2015. 36 FCA Handbook. 37 FCA Handbook. 38 FCA, “Protect yourself from unauthorised firms”, available at: http://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/protect-yourself/unauthorised-firms. 39 FCA, “Applying for Authorisation”, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/fsa-applying-authorisation.pdf. 40 FCA Handbook. 41 FCA Handbook. 42 FCA, “Enforcement Information Guide”, available at https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/enforcement-information-guide.pdf. About NERA NERA Economic Consulting (www.nera.com) is a global firm of experts dedicated to applying economic, finance, and quantitative principles to complex business and legal challenges. For over half a century, NERA’s economists have been creating strategies, studies, reports, expert testimony, and policy recommendations for government authorities and the world’s leading law firms and corporations. We bring academic rigor, objectivity, and real world industry experience to bear on issues arising from competition, regulation, public policy, strategy, finance, and litigation. NERA’s clients value our ability to apply and communicate state-of-the-art approaches clearly and convincingly, our commitment to deliver unbiased findings, and our reputation for quality and independence. Our clients rely on the integrity and skills of our unparalleled team of economists and other experts backed by the resources and reliability of one of the world’s largest economic consultancies. With its main office in New York City, NERA serves clients from more than 25 offices across North America, Europe, and Asia Pacific. Contact For further information and questions, please contact the author: Robert Patton, CFA Associate Director London +44 20 7659 8620 New York City +1 212 345 3269 email@example.com The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of NERA Economic Consulting or any other NERA consultant. Visit www.nera.com to learn more about our practice areas and global offices. © Copyright 2015 National Economic Research Associates, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed in the USA.