Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Mach Mining v. EEOC, 135 S.Ct. 1645 (2015), which held that a judge may review whether the EEOC satisfied its statutory obligation to attempt conciliation before filing suit, and that the scope of that review is narrow, the litigation was remanded to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois for further proceedings consistent with that ruling. Subsequently, the EEOC renewed its motion for partial summary judgment that originally had been denied by the District Court, and filed motions to strike Mach Mining’s evidence regarding the conciliation process. Applying the Supreme Court’s ruling that we previously blogged about here, Judge J. Phil Gilbert of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted in part the EEOC’s motions to strike with respect to evidence of communications during conciliation, and granted the EEOC’s renewed motion for partial summary judgment as to Mach Mining’s defense of failure to conciliate. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11-cv-00879-JPG-PMF (S.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2016).
This decision is required reading for employers engaged in EEOC investigations, conciliations and enforcement litigation.
In 2011, the EEOC filed suit on behalf of a class of female applicants who had applied for non-office jobs at Mach Mining’s Johnston City, Illinois facility. According to the EEOC, Mach Mining “has never hired a single female for a mining-related position,” and “did not even have a women’s bathroom on its mining premises.” Id. at 1. The complaint alleged that since January 1, 2006 Mach Mining engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII. In its answer, Mach Mining asserted the EEOC’s failure to conciliate in good faith under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(b) as an affirmative defense to the litigation.
The EEOC moved for partial summary judgment on Mach Mining’s affirmative defense of failure to conciliate. The District Court denied the motion, finding that the EEOC was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as the EEOC’s pre-suit duty to conciliate was subject to at least some level of judicial review. Id. at 2. The EEOC then filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for certification for appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). The District Court held oral arguments and denied reconsideration of its order, but granted the motion to certify. The Seventh Circuit ultimately reversed and remanded the case back to the District Court for proceedings on the merits. Mach Mining then petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was granted.
The Supreme Court heard arguments on January 13, 2015 and decided on April 29, 2015 that, a judge “may review whether the EEOC satisfied its statutory obligation to attempt conciliation before filing suit…[but] the scope of that review is narrow, thus recognizing the EEOC’s extensive discretion to determine the kind and amount of communication with an employer appropriate in any given case.” Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S.Ct. at 1649 (2015). The Supreme Court reasoned that narrow judicial review of the EEOC’s pre-suit duty to attempt conciliation prior to litigation was appropriate, given the confidential nature of conciliation and the discretion afforded the EEOC under Title VII to determine how to attempt conciliation. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was vacated and the matter was remanded back to the Seventh Circuit for further proceedings. The Seventh Circuit then remanded the case back to the District Court for proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court.
The EEOC subsequently renewed its motion for partial summary judgment on Mach Mining’s affirmative defense of failure to conciliate, arguing that it had sufficiently demonstrated attempting conciliation with Mach Mining, and compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The EEOC also filed two motions to strike, arguing in the first motion that a portion of Mach Mining’s opposition to summary judgment revealed confidential information about the conciliation process in derogation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The District Court previously had denied the EEOC’s attempts to strike this information, agreeing with Mach Mining that the information provided in Mach Mining’s papers was focused on what was missing from the conciliation process, as opposed to what was actually said or done during the process. The EEOC argued in the second motion that portions of Mach Mining’s exhibits and statement of additional undisputed facts in support of its opposition to the EEOC’s motion for partial summary judgment similarly should be stricken.
The District Court’s Decision
The District Court granted the EEOC’s motions to strike, in part, and granted the EEOC partial summary judgment on Mach Mining’s affirmative defense of failure to conciliate. In doing so, the District Court observed that the Supreme Court provided guidance for limited judicial review of the informal “conference, conciliation, and persuasion” requirement of Title VII, and for what information a court may consider in its review. The District Court relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning that a judge “looks only to whether the EEOC attempted to confer about a charge, and not to what happened (i.e., statements made or positions taken) during those discussions.” Mach Mining, No. 11-CV-00879, at 4. The District Court determined that while substantive details had not been disclosed by Mach Mining in its court filings, nevertheless specifics as to that was “said or done” during the conciliation process were disclosed, and went beyond “whether EEOC attempted to confer about a charge.” Id. at 5. Accordingly, the District Court granted the EEOC’s motions to strike portions of Mach Mining’ opposition papers and supporting exhibit.
The District Court declined to strike, however, portions of Mach Mining’s filings attesting to a letter sent by the EEOC stating that conciliation efforts had failed, as well as the date of the lawsuit. The District Court noted that the EEOC previously had stated that such letters were available for review, that the date of filing was a public record, and that information regarding the EEOC’s fiscal year was also publicly available. Id. at 5-6. Accordingly, the District Court found that the information in these paragraphs did not concern statements made or positions taken during conciliation.
Turning to the EEOC’s renewed motion for partial summary judgment, the District Court referred to a two part test outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision to determine whether the EEOC has complied with the statutory requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b): (1) the EEOC must inform the employer about the specific allegation, as it typically does in a letter announcing its determination of reasonable cause; and (2) the EEOC must try to engage the employer in an informal method of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. The District Court also emphasized that the scope of the review was narrow, looking only to whether the EEOC attempted to confer about a charge, and not to the statements made or positions taken during those discussions. Id. at 7. The District Court found that the EEOC’s letter of determination that it sent to Mach Mining on September 17, 2010 satisfied the first prong since it described Mach Mining’s alleged improper conduct and identified the aggrieved individuals.
As to the second prong, the District Court described how the EEOC provided Mach Mining with the proper notice, and as evidenced by the declaration of its own employee, the EEOC engaged in oral and written communications with Mach Mining to provide the company with the opportunity to remedy the discriminatory practices. To refute the EEOC’s affidavit, Mach Mining was required to provide an affidavit or other evidence indicating that the EEOC did not provide the requisite information about the charge or attempt to engage in a discussion about conciliating the claim. The District Court determined that the affidavit provided by Mach Mining only indicated that the EEOC did not provide all of the information that Mach Mining requested, and not that it failed to provide the requisite information. Therefore, the District Court held that the EEOC met the second prong of the test set out by the Supreme Court, and granted partial summary judgment to the EEOC. Id. at 10.
It is noteworthy that at the end of its decision, the District Court commented that “[a]lthough § 2000e-5(b) of 42 U.S.C. prohibits the disclosure of ‘anything said or done’ during the informal conciliation process, it does not prohibit disclosure of information obtained during the EEOC’s investigation and such information becomes available through discovery.” Id. This observation signals a significant difference between the EEOC’s pre-suit duties to investigate and to attempt conciliation.
Implications For Employers
Following this decision, employers can expect that in EEOC-initiated litigation, the EEOC will seek the narrowest review possible of its conciliation processes, asserting that this pre-suit condition is satisfied merely by producing a letter of determination, a notice of failure of conciliation, and an affidavit by EEOC personnel. With regard to EEOC pre-suit investigations, employers should be prepared to document the EEOC’s pre-suit investigatory conduct and enforce Title VII’s requirement of an investigation prior to the EEOC’s initiation of litigation. Armed with this decision, the EEOC will likely aim for the minimum threshold of satisfying its conciliation requirements for the foreseeable future.