In EEOC v. DolGenCorp, LLC d/b/a Dollar General, No. 13-CV-4307 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2015), Judge Andrea R. Wood of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois decided several discovery issues that have become increasingly common in EEOC-initiated disparate impact litigation. In contrast with other recent decisions by other district courts, Judge Wood decided most of these issues in the EEOC’s favor.
That the EEOC’s internal personnel procedures can be discoverable and relevant in disparate impact cases was first established in 2011 in EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., No. 10-CV-2882, 2011 WL 2115878, at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 27, 2011), in a ruling we discussed here. This was the first time a federal court had ever so held, and as a result, many employers have tried a similar tactic in EEOC lawsuits over the past few years.
However, in EEOC v. DolGenCorp., the Court ordered Dollar General to turn over the contact information of Dollar General’s job applicants, even though that information did not contain any information about the race or criminal background of the job applicants. Also in contrast with a recent decision out of the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina we discussed here, the Court refused to compel the EEOC to turn over its internal background check policies, despite the fact that the EEOC is alleging that Dollar General’s background check policy creates disparate impact discrimination against African-Americans. In a better ruling for employers, the Court agreed to examine the EEOC’s internal statistical analyses of Dollar General’s hiring decisions in camera to determine whether the analyses are protected by the deliberative process privilege or work product doctrine.
This case is important for employers because the EEOC will likely use this discovery ruling against employers when similar discovery disputes arise in the future.
The EEOC filed suit against Dollar General, alleging that Dollar General’s use of criminal background checks for applicants is discriminatory because it has a disparate impact on African-American job applicants. EEOC v. DolGenCorp, 13-CV-4307, at 1. During the course of discovery, the EEOC asked Dollar General to turn over the “names, complete social security numbers, addresses, phone numbers, and complete dates of birth” of job applicants, arguing that such information would allow the EEOC to “link separate databases maintained by Dollar General and two of its vendors.” Id. at 2. Dollar General refused, arguing that the requested information was not relevant and was not needed for the EEOC to link the databases. Id.
Also during discovery, Dollar General also sought discovery from the EEOC relative to its internal policies and procedures regarding its own use of criminal background checks in making employment decisions. Id. at 8. The EEOC refused to turn over the information, arguing that it was not relevant. Id. Dollar General also sought any statistical analyses the EEOC had regarding the purported disparate impact of Dollar General’s background check policy. Id. at 6. The EEOC refused to turn its analyses over, claiming that they were protected by the deliberative process privilege and work product doctrine. Id.
Both parties moved to compel production of the requested documents.
The Court’s Decision
The Court first decided the EEOC’s motion to compel production of the personal information of Dollar General’s conditional hires. The Court found that the requested information was discoverable because it was “calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” insofar as it would allow “the EEOC and its experts more effectively to analyze the statistical impact of Dollar General’s use of criminal background checks” by giving the EEOC the ability to link Dollar General’s databases. Id. at 3. While Dollar General argued that this linking could be done by other means, the Court found that the EEOC was not required to use those means when it could use the personal information to accomplish its goal. Id. at 3 n.1. The Court further found that Dollar General’s suggested linking method might not be “verifiably accurate,” further supporting the Court’s conclusion that the personal information requested by the EEOC was discoverable. Id.
The Court next considered whether the EEOC’s policies and procedures on using background checks in its own hiring decisions were discoverable. The Court pointed out that such information would only be discoverable if Dollar General could potentially use it to show that its use of criminal background checks was “job related for the position in question.” Id. at 9 (emphasis in original). While agreeing with Dollar General that a government agency’s employment policies can be discoverable in employment discrimination litigation, it found that such policies would not be relevant to Dollar General’s defenses in this case because Dollar General had not shown that “the functions performed by its employees are in any way comparable to those undertaken by the EEOC’s employees.” Id. The Court thus denied Dollar General’s motion to compel production of the EEOC’s background check policies and procedures. Id.
The Court finally considered whether the EEOC’s statistical analyses of Dollar General’s background check policies were protected by either the deliberative process privilege or work product doctrine. The Court pointed out that the EEOC argued that its statistical analyses were prepared “during the EEOC’s investigation to determine whether to issue a reasonable cause determination of discrimination,” and that they were thus protected by the deliberative process privilege. Id. at 7. The Court further pointed out that EEOC argued that its analyses were also protected by the work product doctrine because they were used by the EEOC’s attorneys in making the decision to sue Dollar General and because one of the analyses was provided to an EEOC investigator by an EEOC attorney. Id. at 7-8. The Court concluded that it could not determine whether the EEOC’s privilege and work product assertions were correct based on these arguments, and thus ordered the EEOC to produce the analyses to the Court for in camera review. Id. at 8.
Implications For Employers
This case is significant for employers because it will undoubtedly be used by the EEOC when it seeks personal information that, while not relevant in itself, could arguably be used to find or create relevant evidence, and when the EEOC seeks to block production of its own hiring practices in disparate impact litigation. Employers who are engaged in such litigation should anticipate this and try to preempt the EEOC’s use of this case by addressing the Court’s reasoning when responding to or bringing a similar motion to compel. For example, employers seeking the EEOC’s background check policies should present arguments for why their employees perform similar functions as the EEOC’s employees. In the meantime, we expect other courts to confront similar discovery disputes in EEOC-initiated disparate impact litigation and to provide further guidance to employers as they work through discovery in such cases.